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A. HEADING 2 
This article is about the privatization of the civil dispute resolution 
system, and in particular, the resulting ramifications for democracy. 
Privatization is occurring at all levels of the public justice system.  First, in 
the civil justice system, there is an increasingly overwhelming tendency to 
resolve disputes through mechanisms other than the traditional public 
court process.  For example, mandatory court-based mediation rules, 
judicial dispute resolution initiatives, case management regimes, pre-trial 
conferences, and cost-based settlement incentives have all become central 
pillars of modern civil justice system tools and reforms that – either 
directly or indirectly – encourage the resolution of disputes through 
methods that are outside of the formal, public trial process. 
Second, alongside civil court initiatives, privatization is occurring 
in the administrative system as well.  Tribunals and other administrative 
processes are increasingly experimenting with formal and informal 
alternatives to their traditional hearing-based processes.  Third, non-
administrative legislative regimes – typically including arbitration statutes 
– also continue to sanction (and encourage) the resolution of civil disputes
outside the formal court system.  Fourth, privatization is also occurring in 
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.  I am very grateful to the Canadian
Institute for the Administration of Justice (CIAJ) for awarding me the 2007 Charles D. 
Gonthier Research Fellowship, which made the research for this article possible.  I am 
also grateful to the CIAJ for providing me with the opportunity to present this article as 
the closing paper at the 2007 CIAJ annual meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia on 12 October 
2007.  Patricia Hania, Ada Ho and Alan Melamud provided excellent research assistance 
for various aspects of this article, for which I am also extremely grateful. 
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parts of the criminal justice system.  Although the state is essentially 
always part of the criminal process, plea-bargaining, community-based 
diversion programs and restorative justice initiatives have been – and are 
increasingly becoming – significant alternatives (or complements) to the 
more formal, public trial-based criminal dispute resolution system.  
Finally, all of these state-based privatized (or privatizing) systems – civil, 
administrative, legislative and criminal – are in addition to the already 
robust, millennia-old tradition of resolving most disputes through 
mechanisms entirely separate from formal state processes (private 
negotiations, religious and community-based dispute resolution tools, 
etc.). 
There are many sound and well-documented reasons for these 
privatizing trends, including reduced costs, increased speed and efficiency, 
privacy, enhanced autonomy through increased party choice within and 
control over dispute resolution processes, etc.  However, there are also a 
number of costs to these trends relating to, or involving negative impacts 
on the development of the common law, potential procedural unfairness 
and power imbalances between disputants.  These costs are all reasons 
enough – in themselves – to be concerned about these wide-ranging 
trends.  However, my main concern – and the driving concern behind this 
article – is the potential negative impact that the privatization of public 
dispute resolution processes has on systems of democratic governance. 
Civil society is publicly regulated largely through legislation and 
adjudication.  The adjudicative function – particularly in the context of the 
post-WW II welfare state – is clearly a central pillar of our processes of 
government.  To the extent that we are actively privatizing how we do 
adjudication, we are in effect actively privatizing a large part of the way 
we govern ourselves in modern democracies.  Unlike the benefits of 
privatization, about which people have been actively talking for some 
time, there is comparatively very little discussion or debate about the costs 
of privatizing our civil justice system.  As one commentator has recently 
noted, although the move to privatize the justice system and its results are 
being “recently discovered,” they are certainly “still not understood.”1  
                                                 
1 Tracy Walters McCormack, “Privatizing the Justice System” (2006) 25 Rev. of Lit. 735 
at pt. i [“Privatizing the Justice System”]. 
 




This lack of understanding is of particular concern given the ongoing and 
significant institutional reforms that are occurring in our justice system 
and the fundamental public interest values that are stake. 
In seeking to address this concern, this article focuses on three 
parts of the justice system: the civil justice system, the administrative law 
system, and non-administrative-based legislative initiatives – typically 
including arbitration statutes – that actively sanction the resolution of civil 
disputes outside of the public court and administrative law systems.2  It 
does not focus on privatizing initiatives in the criminal justice system.3 
By focusing on these three elements of the justice system, this 
article in turn has three main goals.  First, it seeks to bear witness to the 
modern and wide-ranging privatization initiatives that are currently 
defining the way we think about and resolve almost all civil disputes.  
Second, it seeks to articulate the benefits and costs of these initiatives, 
particularly including their negative impact on the way we publicly 
regulate ourselves in modern, democratic societies.  Third, this article 
makes recommendations for future thinking about, and approaches to 
these initiatives.  In so doing, it calls on jurists, civil justice system 
reformers, elected representatives and citizens to engage in a robust debate 
about all aspects of the privatization of civil justice, the future of which 
will have a fundamental impact on our public processes of democracy. 
                                                 
2 This article also touches on the entirely private system – including negotiation and 
mediation, etc. – to the extent that the private system is annexed directly through the 
public stream (either through the court system, the administrative system, or through 
legislative initiatives).   
 
3 For commentary on alternative, privatizing criminal justice initiatives, specifically 
including plea-bargaining initiatives, see e.g. Joseph Di Luca, “Expedient McJustice or 
Principled Alternative Dispute Resolution?  A Review of Plea Bargaining in Canada” 
(2005) 50 Crim. L.Q. 14.  I am grateful to James Stribopoulos and Mary M. Birdsell for 
assistance on this criminal law point.  For a general critique of restorative justice, see e.g. 
Annalise A. Acorn, Compulsory Compassion: A Critique of Restorative Justice 
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II. BACKGROUND: THE “DEALERSHIP” CASE 
 Before looking at what I mean by privatization and some of its 
representative processes, benefits and costs, I first set out the story of a 
case – the “Dealership” case – that has dramatically influenced my 
thinking and driven my concerns in this area of my civil justice research.  
The case is also useful for animating some of the issues and arguments 
that I make throughout this article.  Because, in my previous career as a 
litigator, I was co-counsel on the case, I have an inside perspective on it.  I 
also, for the same reason, am limited in what I can say both because of 
basic solicitor-client confidentiality obligations and also because of a strict 
confidentiality agreement.  However, although I have changed and omitted 
some names and facts to comply with all of my professional, ethical and 
legal obligations, the case that I present below is a case that actually 
happened.  And I know, based on my own previous litigation practice and 
my current research, that it certainly is not a unique case. 
 For almost 50 years John, who immigrated to the United States 
when he was very young, operated a dealership in the Midwestern United 
States.  He sold merchandise made exclusively by one of the biggest and 
most familiar manufacturers in United States history (the “Manufacturer”).  
John was an extremely popular dealer who won sales awards in almost all 
categories.  He was a true American success story.  Late in his career John 
was asked – purportedly by the Manufacturer’s computer services 
division’s local representative (who John had known and dealt with for 
years) and as part of the overall obligations and expectations set out in his 
dealership agreement – to purchase a new computer system and computer 
services package.  Doing (as he always did) what the computer 
representative suggested and what he understood to be what the 
Manufacturer required, John agreed to purchase – without doing any 
research or “comparison shopping” – the full computer system and a long-
term service package (the “Contract”). 
As it turned out, the computer representative did not work for the 
Manufacturer but rather for a newly-reorganized, separate and privately-
held multinational corporation (the “Corporation”).  Notwithstanding the 
change in corporate structure and ownership, however, the representative’s 
uniform, business card and letterhead continued – as they always had – to 
use the Manufacturer’s logo.  The computer system that the representative 




recommended (and that John purchased) was designed for a much bigger 
dealership (or series of dealerships) than what John operated.  Further, the 
cost of the equipment and services was vastly higher than the cost of the 
same equipment and services found on the open market.  Finally, there 
was no Manufacturer requirement under John’s dealership agreement to 
purchase the equipment or services.  Put simply, the Corporation, relying 
on John’s good faith, history of service, relationship with the 
representative and virtually blind loyalty to the Manufacturer, sold John an 
incredibly overpriced computer system and unreasonably lengthy service 
package that he did not need (or in fact want). 
Subsequently, when John discovered the truth about the 
Corporation, the computer equipment and the service package, he decided 
to stop further payments and seek to resolve the matter with the 
Manufacturer and the Corporation.  Because of the separate ownership 
structure of the Corporation, the Manufacturer wanted nothing to do with 
the dispute.  The Corporation, for its part, was not willing to make any 
concessions.  Further, based on the clear wording of the Contract and on 
John’s refusal to pay, the Corporation proceeded to take legal action.  
Because the Contract provided that “all disputes” arising under the 
Contract were to be resolved pursuant to the commercial arbitration rules 
of a major American arbitration association, the Corporation initiated 
arbitration proceedings against John. 
The Corporation’s claim was simple: John should make the 
payments owed under the Contract.  John, in his defense and counter-
claim, argued that, in a nutshell, because the costs of the system and 
services were not only unreasonably high but were based on what 
amounted to at least a contract of adhesion if not fraud, the Contract 
should be set aside and he should be compensated for his losses (the 
payments that he had made to that date under the Contract).4  After a 
week-long hearing, the arbitrator found for the Corporation and dismissed 
John’s counter-claim.  Notwithstanding several years of preparation, 
volumes of documentary discovery and weeks of depositions, the 
                                                 
4 An animating (and aggravating) factor for John’s defence and counter-claim was the 
fact that, given the system’s incompatibility for a smaller dealership the size of John’s, it 
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arbitrator – consistent with the arbitration association’s practice, rules and 
guidelines – provided no oral or written reasons at all for his judgment.  
And because of the terms of the Contract, John essentially had no right of 
appeal. 
Reasonable people can always disagree – particularly in hindsight 
– as to what the correct result should have been in a given case.  While I 
am convinced that the arbitrator in the Dealership case got it wrong, I do 
not think that he acted in bad faith.  However, as I discuss later in this 
article,5 I am strongly of the view that the business practices of the 
Corporation that led to the dispute were at least unfairly aggressive, were 
likely pursued – at least by some – in bad faith, were part of a systematic 
and nation-wide approach of the Corporation to target similarly situated 
dealers through deceptive business practices and, as a result, likely 
amounted to fraud.  Further, in addition to the questionable conduct on the 
part of the Corporation, I know – as I also discuss later in this article6 – 
that the lawyers for the Corporation acted on numerous occasions 
unprofessionally and in bad faith.   
Unfortunately, the private dispute resolution system in which we 
were working – state-sanctioned commercial arbitration – did not provide 
the tools by which such conduct on the part of either the Corporation or its 
lawyers could be properly discovered, made public, prohibited or 
sanctioned.  Part of the reason, as is discussed further below,7 was the 
system’s lack of meaningful procedural safeguards.  The more significant 
reason, in my view, was the curtain of secrecy – provided for by 
strategically drafted wide-ranging confidentiality provisions – that 
shielded the systematically suspect conduct of the Corporation and its 
lawyers in our proceeding, and in all of the similar proceedings about 
which we knew but could do nothing about.  It is to these types of privacy 
issues – and their related impact both on individual litigants and on the 
regulation of large sectors of society – to which I now turn. 
                                                 











What do I mean by privatization?8  Privatization, as I will further 
discuss and develop throughout this article, means four (often related) 
things.   
A. JURISDICTIONAL PREFERENCES 
First, as a matter of jurisdiction, it means a preference for moving 
away from directly state-funded and state-run dispute resolution forums 
(e.g. civil courts or administrative tribunals) and toward typically 
privately-organized and privately-funded initiatives (e.g. private mediation 
chambers or arbitration regimes, etc.).  This preference has led to what the 
Supreme Court of Canada has recently described as the creation of a 
“private justice system.”9  It was also this form of privatization that was 
specifically at issue in the Dealership case: a forum selection clause in the 
Corporation’s standard form Contract that ousted the jurisdiction of a 
court in favour of a private arbitration regime.10  
                                                 
8 The privatization of civil justice is a topic that I have been specifically thinking about 
for some time and in which – given its fundamental procedural and normative 
implications – I continue to be interested.  For some preliminary thinking on the topic, 
see e.g. Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System” (2006) 9 
News & Views on Civil Justice Reform 16, online: Canadian Forum on Civil Justice 
(CFCJ) <http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/issue_9/CFCJ%20(eng)%20spring%202006-
Privatizing.pdf> [“Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System”], Trevor C. W. Farrow, 
“Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate” (2006) 15:2 Const. Forum Const. 79 [“Re-
Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate”], Trevor C. W. Farrow, “The rule of law in 
developing countries is not just about courts” 26:31 The Lawyers Weekly (15 December 
2006) (QL) [“The rule of law in developing countries is not just about courts”].  For some 
earlier comments, see Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice 
and Legal Education” (2005) 42 Alta. L. Rev. 741 at 797-798 [“Dispute Resolution, 
Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”].  See further Andrew Pirie, “Critiques of 
Settlement Advocacy” [“Critiques of Settlement Advocacy”] in Colleen M. Hanycz, 
Trevor C. W. Farrow and Frederick H. Zemans, The Theory and Practice of 
Representative Negotiation (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2008) at c. 11. 
 
9 Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, 2007 SCC 34, at para. 132 
(reference omitted). 
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Further, even within the public court system, there is a continued 
and increasing preference – expressly promoted by all stakeholders in the 
public civil dispute resolution system, including governments, courts and 
judges, lawyers, law societies, bar associations, law schools and clients – 
for using private processes such as mandatory mediation regimes, judicial 
dispute resolution initiatives, settlement negotiations, etc., rather than the 
publicly-scrutinized full trial process. 
B. PRIVACY 
Second, as an information flow matter, privatization means moving 
disputes out of the public eye and into confidential, or at least largely 
private, settings.  This aspect of privatization is part of the confidential 
processes in the public justice and administrative law systems (e.g. 
mandatory or voluntary mediation programs that increasingly form parts 
of both of those public systems).  It is also a defining badge of private 
processes (e.g. commercial arbitration).  Again, this aspect of privatization 
was at issue in the Dealership case: it was clearly the motivation of the 
Corporation to keep its affairs out of the eyes of the public.11 
C. LAWYERS: PROFESSIONALISM AND COMMERCIALISM 
Third, the active involvement of lawyers in the settlement process 
through various ADR regimes including court-annexed judicial dispute 
resolution processes and private settlement negotiations has become an 
important and relatively newly-recognized aspect of lawyers’ professional 
responsibility obligations.  Further, as a commercial matter, privatization 
at the same time recognizes the increased role for private, for-profit actors 
in the resolution of civil disputes.  The number of lawyers and other 
professionals advertising an expertise in all ADR areas and processes 
continues to expand in Canada. 
D. CIVIL SOCIETY 
Fourth, as a social relations matter, privatization downloads the 
resolution of civil disputes from the public and collective levels of civil 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
 




society to more intimate and private spheres: the family, religious 
communities, the boardroom, the web, etc.12 
E. OVERALL RESULT 
All of these understandings of privatization animate the various 
arguments that I make in this article.  The overall result of these four 
meanings of privatization – taken together – is a systematic increase in the 
number of all kinds of disputes, including commercial manufacturing and 
service disputes, employment disputes, pay-equity disputes, police 
complaints, family disputes, human rights complaints, etc., that are being 
decided in private, using private adjudicators, with no public access, and 
without necessarily any of the procedural safeguards that are typically 
provided for in our public court or tribunal systems.13  These forms of 
privatization are encouraged, mandated and/or happening in all sectors and 
at all levels of the civil justice system, the administrative system and 
through statutorily-encouraged private dispute resolution initiatives. 
IV. GOVERNMENT PREFERENCES FOR PRIVATIZATION 
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that the introduction 
into, and encouragement of privatization initiatives in these three levels of 
the civil dispute resolution system is part of a larger – federal and 
provincial – government strategy to encourage the privatization of dispute 
resolution in relation essentially to all activities in which the government 
is involved or regarding which it has some direct or indirect connection.   
At the federal level, for example, Canada’s Dispute Resolution 
Service (DRS) was established in 1992, under the watch of the 
Department of Justice, actively to promote ADR and related services.  
According to its materials: 
…DRS…is devoted to the prevention and management of 
disputes.  Our mandate is to serve as a leading centre of DR 
                                                 
12 For a useful treatment of changes in public and private space, see Law Commission of 
Canada, ed., New Perspectives on the Public-Private Divide (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
2003). 
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excellence in Canada.  Our role is to promote a greater 
understanding of DR and assist in the integration of DR 
into the policies, operations and practices of departments 
and agencies of the Government of Canada, Crown 
Corporations, federal tribunals and administrative agencies, 
and federally constituted courts.14 
 
 At the provincial level, similar initiatives have been pursued.  In 
British Columbia, for example, the Government – through the Ministry of 
Attorney General – has developed an active policy of ADR promotion 
through the 1996 creation of the Dispute Resolution Office (DRO).  
According to its public materials: 
The Ministry of Attorney General’s…[DRO] develops and 
promotes non-adversarial dispute resolution options within 
the justice system and government.  Options such as 
mediation encourage early settlement of disputes and are 
less expensive than processes used in the formal court 
system.15 
 
 The policy considerations behind these initiatives are animated by 
the general reform trends and research projects carried out over the past 
several decades in various Commonwealth countries – including Canada16 
                                                 
14 Department of Justice Canada, “DRS Programs and Services” (last updated: 24 April 
2007), online: Government of Canada 
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/ps/drs/drs_programs.html>. 
 
15 B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, “DRO”, online: B.C. Government 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/>. 
 
16 The B.C. Ministry of Attorney General specifies that the DRO initiatives “are largely 
outcomes of considerable research and study carried out in the 1990’s by organizations 
and professional groups across common law jurisdictions, for example, the Canadian Bar 
Association’s Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report, Lord Wolff’s Report on 
Access to Justice, England, and Managing Justice: A Review of the Federal Civil Justice 
System, a report published by the Australian Law Reform Commission.”  See ibid. at 




– toward simplified and privatized ADR initiatives across all aspects of the 
public civil dispute resolution spectrum.  Again according to the B.C. 
Ministry of Attorney General: 
There is considerable interest in resolving civil disputes 
outside of the formal court system.  Options such as 
mediation are being employed by the courts, administrative 
tribunals, and ministries and agencies of the Government of 
BC to provide people with viable dispute resolution 
processes… 
The Ministry of Attorney General has adopted an ADR 
Policy, signaling its commitment to a justice and conflict 
resolution environment which includes a wide range of 
dispute resolution options.  In 1996, the ministry 
established the…DRO…to develop and implement dispute 
resolution options in the court system and in government. 
Since 1996, the DRO has worked with a number of 
government ministries, boards, agencies and commissions 
to design and help implement [] dispute resolution 
processes.  It has also helped organizations consider ways 
to improve existing processes to make them more efficient 
and effective.17 
The goals of these sorts of initiatives are clear.  For example, the 
Ministry of Attorney General states its intention to, among other things: 
Further develop the ADR policy to broaden and encourage 
the application of dispute resolution options through: 
                                                                                                                         
“Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and Design”, online: B.C. Government 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/policy-design/index.htm>.  Some of these reform 
initiatives are cited and discussed further in this article.  See e.g. infra note 32 and 
surrounding text. 
 
17 B.C. Ministry of Attorney General, DRO, “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and 
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a) continuing consultation with dispute 
resolution stakeholders and advocates; 
b) promoting the use of alternative dispute 
resolution options among all ministries 
and agencies of government; 
c) promoting the use of alternative dispute 
resolution techniques in neighbourhood 
or community disputes; 
d) identifying and removing barriers to the 
understanding and use of alternative 
dispute resolution options; 
e) supporting multi-party alternative 
dispute resolution processes such as land 
use planning, aboriginal treaty.18 
Three key aspects of these sorts of federal and provincial 
government dispute resolution preferences include encouraging the 
privatization of civil dispute resolution in the civil justice system 
(discussed immediately below), the administrative system (discussed infra 
at part VI), and through provincial and federal arbitration and other 
enabling dispute resolution legislative initiatives (discussed infra at part 
VII).  
V. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The first part of the public civil dispute resolution system on which 
I focus in this article is the civil justice system, with a primary focus on 
the provincial superior civil courts. 
A. SUPERIOR COURTS 
Modern provincial superior courts of record throughout Canada 
enjoy the plenary jurisdiction, power and authority at law and in equity 
                                                 
18 Ibid. at “Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy and Design: Policy Statement, 
Objectives” (objective 12), online: B.C. Government 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/policy-design/statement.htm>. 
 




that were historically exercised by the courts of common law and equity in 
England and subsequently in early Canada.19  This plenary jurisdiction 
provides courts with “all the powers that are necessary to do justice” 
(typically within the province20), which is a jurisdiction that is “unlimited 
and unrestricted in substantive law in civil matters.”21  This jurisdiction is 
limited only “where provided specifically to the contrary” by a “special 
law”.22   
This adjudicative regime provides for a publicly funded dispute 
resolution system that is – at least in theory23 – open to all parties and to 
all disputes.  As summarized by John Godfrey Spragge (when advocating 
– before becoming a Chancellor of Upper Canada – for an early court of 
equity in Upper Canada), this system, which is “built upon precedent and 
                                                 
19 See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 11(2).  See also Constitution 
Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3 (U.K.), ss. 92(13)-(14), 96-100, 129. 
 
20 For rules regarding the commencement of proceedings within and without a province, 
see e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, as amended, rr. 16-17.  
For a discussion of the extraterritorial application of a provincial superior court’s 
jurisdiction, see e.g. Janet Walker gen. ed. et al., The Civil Litigation Process: Cases and 
Materials, 6th ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2005) [The Civil Litigation Process] at 
249-271. 
 
21 80 Wellesley St. East Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd. et. al., [1972] 2 O.R. 280, Brooke 
J.A. (CA) (QL).  See also Board v. Board (1919), 48 D.L.R. 13 (P.C.).  For a brief history 
of the courts in Canada, see The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 18-44. 
 
22 80 Wellesley St. East Ltd. v. Fundy Bay Builders Ltd. et. al., supra note 21.  For 
contrary jurisdictional legislation, see e.g. Courts of Justice Act, supra note 19 at s. 148 
(recognizing the jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Canada). 
 
23 Of course there is overwhelming evidence of the lack of access to courts that many, if 
not most, Canadians experience today.  And this lack of access is one of the reasons for 
the development of alternative models of civil dispute resolution, as discussed further 
below (infra note 126 and surrounding text).  For a further discussion, see “Dispute 
Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8.  And there is also 
evidence that the court system, although in theory open, did not always provide for just 
and progressive decisions and policies for all members of society.  For a discussion of 
some of these issues, see W. Bogart, Courts and Country (Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1994) 107-124 [Courts and Country], cited in The Civil Litigation Process, supra 
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authority”, is established by the state “so that a man may, with reasonable 
certainty, know what the law is, and govern himself accordingly”.24  To 
bring into effect this regulatory influence of this system, court orders are 
entered in the entry book of the provincial registrar,25 precedents are 
published, and “all court hearings shall be open to the public.”26  Taken 
together, this regime provides an adjudication tool that has played an 
“instrumental” role in the “historical development of Canada” and in 
“economic growth”27 and that continues to be “an essential component of 
our democratic form of government.”28 
B. PRIVATIZATION THROUGH ADR AND OTHER REFORMS 
Almost since their inception, concerns over the high cost, low 
efficiency and imperfect access to these public court systems have led to 
continued reform efforts.  In the United States, for example, according to 
an 1850 proposal, reforms to the civil procedure system of New York were 
“to make legal proceedings more intelligible, more certain, more speedy, 
and less expensive.”29  Similar wording is found in most modern reform 
efforts as well, which really hit their stride in the 1970s in the United 
                                                 
24 From a pamphlet by John Godfrey Spragge (untitled and undated) in The Civil 
Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 20. 
 
25 See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 20 at r. 59.05. 
 
26 See e.g. Courts of Justice Act, supra note 19 at s. 135(1) (subject to the limited 
exceptions provided for in s. 135(2)). 
 
27 M. H. Ogilvie, “Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History” (1987) 19 
Ottawa L. Rev. 225 at 237, 239 [“Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal 
History”]. 
 
28 Wayne D. Brazil, “Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil 
Justice” (2007) 22 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 227 at 241.  For comments that these 
progressive values were more present in American than in Canadian courts in the 1800s 
and early 1900s, see “Recent Developments in Canadian Law: Legal History”, supra note 
27 at 250-251.  See also Courts and Country, supra note 23.  Regardless, the influence of 
the courts on the development of economic and social relations in Canada, particularly 
over the past 25 years, is undeniable. 
 
29 Arphaxed Loomis, David Graham and David Dudley Field, “Commission of Practice 
& Pleadings Code Civ. Proc.: Report” (N.Y., iii, 1850) (HeinOnline). 
 




States in the context of widespread dissatisfaction with the overall 
administration of civil justice.  Those reform initiatives – including for 
example the 1976 Pound Conference and discussions by Frank Sander and 
his colleagues at Harvard Law School30 about a multi-door courthouse – 
continue to drive modern thinking about ways of making the delivery of 
civil justice more accessible and efficient.31 
Reform initiatives across Canada have followed their American 
counterparts.  In 1996, at the national level, the Canadian Bar Association 
engaged in a wide-ranging and influential review of the delivery of civil 
justice in Canada.  Numerous observations and recommendations, made in 
that report, have led to significant and ongoing reform initiatives in this 
country.32 
                                                 
30 For comment on the influence of these individuals on modern dispute resolution 
reforms, see e.g. Jay Folberg, “A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of 
Practice” in (1983) 1 Mediation Q., c. 1, p. 3 at 7.  For some of their ideas, see e.g. Frank 
E. A. Sander, “Varieties of Dispute Processing” in A. Leo Levin and Russell R. Wheeler, 
eds., The Pound Conference: Perspectives on Justice in the Future (St. Paul: West 
Publishing, 1979) 65. 
 
31 For brief discussions of ADR’s modern history, see e.g. “Dispute Resolution, Access to 
Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at pt. II.A-C, Trevor C. W. Farrow, 
“Thinking About Dispute Resolution”, Review Essay (2003) 41 Alta. L. Rev. 559 at pt. I.  
See further e.g. Warren E. Burger, “Isn’t There a Better Way?” (1982) 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 
Brian Dickson, “ADR, The Courts and The Judicial System: The Canadian Context” 
(1994) 28 L. Soc’y Gaz. 231 at 236, George W. Adams, Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute 
Negotiations (Toronto: CCH Canadian, 2003) at 12-15, D. Paul Emond, “Alternative 
Dispute Resolution: A Conceptual Overview” in D. Paul Emond, ed., Commercial 
Dispute Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 1989) 1 
[“A Conceptual Overview”], “Critiques of Settlement Advocacy”, supra note 8 at 290-
292, Andrew Pirie, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Skills, Science, and the Law (Toronto: 
Irwin Law, 2000) at 1-33, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, “Introduction: What Will We Do 
When Adjudication Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR” (1997) 44 UCLA L. 
Rev. 1613.  
 
32 See Canadian Bar Association (CBA), Task Force on Systems of Civil Justice, 
“Systems of Civil Justice Task Force Report” (Ottawa: CBA, 1996), online: CBA 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/pubs/pdf/systemscivil_tfreport.pdf> [“CBA Task Force 
Report”].  The CFCJ and others held two “Into the Future” conferences recently to 
discuss the “agenda for civil justice reform” coming out of the “CBA Task Force 
Report”.  For useful papers and discussions from those conferences, see CFCJ, “Into the 
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However, notwithstanding these significant initiatives, the same 
calls for reforms to address cost, speed and backlogs continue to be made.  
For example, in December 2006, former Ontario Chief Justice R. Roy 
McMurtry made the following comments: 
In Ontario, it has been recognized for some years that our 
civil justice system is in a crisis… 
I became a judge in 1991 and very quickly learned that the 
issue of access to civil justice would be the principal justice 
challenge for the foreseeable future.  In 1995, as the Chief 
Justice of the Superior Court, I referred to the crisis and 
stated publicly that:  
As well as the increasing cost, the system is 
labouring under the tremendous weight of a 
growing backlog of cases and a serious lack 
of adequate resources.  Litigants must wait 
an inordinate length of time to resolve their 
civil disputes.  Significant initiatives are 
absolutely essential if our court is to be able 
to provide timely and affordable justice to 
the citizens of this province. 
                                                                                                                         
Future – Conference Papers”, online CFCJ <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/publications/itf-
en.php#1>.  For a further discussion of the CBA initiatives, see “Dispute Resolution, 
Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at pt. II.C.  For useful sources 
for civil justice reform initiatives, see Margaret A. Shone, “Civil Justice Reform in 
Canada: 1996 to 2006 and Beyond” (December 2006), online: CFCJ <http://cfcj-
fcjc.org/docs/2006/shone-final-en.pdf> [“Civil Justice Reform in Canada: 1996 to 2006 
and Beyond”], CFCJ, “Inventory of Reforms”, online CFCJ <http://cfcj-
fcjc.org/news/?cat=2> (which includes reform initiatives in Canada from 1950-2007).  
For discussions of, and links to many of the civil justice reform initiatives discussed 
below, see CFCJ, “Civil Justice News”, online: CFCJ <http://cfcj-fcjc.org/news/?cat=2> 
[“Civil Justice News”].  This portion of this article is significantly influenced by those 
sources, discussions and links. 
 




Well, almost twelve years later, the crisis has deepened 
despite the best efforts of a lot of people, judges, lawyers 
and officials in the Ministry of the Attorney General.33 
At the provincial and territorial levels, numerous efforts are being 
made to address the kinds of “crisis” that the former Chief Justice of 
Ontario described.  Every superior court in Canada has been looking at 
ways of making civil dispute resolution processes more efficient and 
effective.34  For example, the B.C. Justice Review Task Force recently 
released its “Effective and Affordable Civil Justice” report35 and proposed 
new rules of civil procedure.36  In Alberta, the Rules Project of the Alberta 
Law Reform Institute (ALRI) also recently released its proposed new rules 
of civil procedure.37  Ontario38 and Nova Scotia39 are both currently 
                                                 
33 The Honourable R. Roy McMurtry, CFCJ, Civil Justice Reform Conference: Phase II, 
Remarks (7 December 2006) at 3-4, online: CFCJ <http://cfcj-
fcjc.org/docs/2006/mcmurtry-en.pdf> [“McMurtry Remarks”].  
 
34 For a very useful and comprehensive study of, and recommendations regarding, civil 
justice reform initiatives across Canada, see “Civil Justice Reform in Canada: 1996 to 
2006 and Beyond”, supra note 32.  Of course, similar initiatives are being experimented 
with in courts not only in Canada but also in most countries around the world.  For the 
present purpose, however, this part of this article will primarily limit itself to reform 
initiatives in Canadian courts. 
 
35 Civil Justice Reform Working Group to the Justice Review Task Force, “Effective and 




36 B.C. Justice Review Task Force, “Proposed New Rules of Civil Procedure of the 
British Columbia Supreme Court” (23 July 2007), online: B.C. Justice Review Task 
Force, <http://www.bcjusticereviewforum.ca/civilrules/downloads/conceptDraft.pdf>.  
For earlier B.C. reform initiatives, see e.g. Hon. E. N. Hughes, Access to Justice: Report 
of the Justice Reform Committee (Victoria: Ministry of Attorney General, 1988). 
 
37 ALRI, “Alberta Rules of Court”, Test Draft 3 (February 2007), online: University of 




38 See Hon. Coulter A. Osborne, Q.C., “Civil Justice Reform Project” (November 2007), 
online: Ontario Government 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjrp/>.  For earlier Ontario 
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pursuing significant civil justice reform projects.  Québec, several years 
ago, enacted significant changes to its Code of Civil Procedure.40  And 
other jurisdictions are similarly engaged in significant reform initiatives.41 
Because the main concerns that underlie these reform efforts often 
include – as the former Chief Justice of Ontario identified – speed and 
cost, many of the potential solutions involve ADR and ADR-related 
initiatives.  As McMurtry J. stated, in these types of reform initiatives, “we 
recognize that ADR is now firmly entrenched.”42  It is these kinds of ADR 
reforms that form essential elements of the privatization trends that I am 
discussing in this article.  For example, court-annexed mediation,43 judge-
                                                                                                                         
reform initiatives, see e.g. Zuber Commission Report: Ontario, “Report of Ontario Courts 
Inquiry”, by T. G. Zuber (Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, 1987), Law 
Society of Upper Canada (LSUC), “Alternatives – The Report of the Dispute Resolution 
Subcommittee” (Toronto: LSUC, 1993), Ontario Civil Justice Review, “Civil Justice 
Review: Supplemental and Final Report” (Toronto: Ontario Civil Justice Review, 1996). 
 
39 See e.g. The Court of Nova Scotia, Civil Procedure Rules Nova Scotia: Rules Revision 
Project, online: The Court of Nova Scotia 
<http://www.courts.ns.ca/rules_revision/revision.htm>.  
 
40 R.S.Q., c. C-25 (updated to 1 September 2007), online: Éditeur official du Québec 
<http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=2&
file=/C_25/C25_A.HTM>.  For commentary on Québec’s civil justice reform process, 
see Justice Québec, “Reform of Civil Procedure”, online: Justice Québec 
<http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/ministere/dossiers/crpc/crpc-a.htm>.  
 
41 See e.g. Yukon Government, News Release, “Government Modernizing Yukon Courts 
By Amending Three Acts” (31 October 2005), online: Yukon Government 
<http://www.gov.yk.ca/news/2005/05-284.html>.  See earlier Manitoba, Civil Justice 
Review Task Force, “Manitoba Civil Justice Review Task Force Report” (Winnipeg: 
Department of Justice, 1996) (Chair: David Newman).  Many of these reform initiatives 
discussed in this note and notes 34-40 and surrounding text are also discussed briefly in 
“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at n. 46 
and surrounding text.  See also CFCJ, “Civil Justice News”, supra note 32. 
 
42 “McMurtry Remarks”, supra note 33 at 7. 
 
43 See e.g. Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta, Civil Practice Note No. 11, “Court 
Annexed Mediation” (effective 1 September 2004), online: Alberta Courts 
<http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/qb/practicenotes/civil/pn11CourtAnnexedMediation.pdf
>, Saskatchewan, Queen’s Bench Act, 1998, S.S. 1998, c. Q-1.01, s. 42 (“Mediation”), 
Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25 at r. 24.1 (“Mandatory Mediation”). 




assisted44 and judicial dispute resolution programs,45 specific family-
related mediation services in superior courts,46 notices to mediate,47 etc., 
all directly provide for non-trial-based, typically private alternative 
processes for the resolution of court-based civil disputes.   
The motivation behind these court-connected ADR initiatives is 
clear: “to reduce cost and delay in litigation and facilitate the early and fair 
resolution of disputes.”48  Further, case management49 and pre-trial 
conference50 initiatives provide judges with other robust tools for the 
encouragement and facilitation of private settlements out of court (or at 
least out of the scrutiny of the public court room).51  Additionally, 
                                                                                                                         
 
44 See e.g. Québec’s judge-assisted “Settlement Conference” initiative: Justice Québec, 
“Settlement Conference of the Superior Court of Québec”, online: 
<http://www.justice.gouv.qc.ca/english/publications/generale/amiable-cs-a.htm>. 
 
45 For a discussion of the Judicial Dispute Resolution program in Alberta’s Court of 
Queen’s Bench, see the Honourable Justice John A. Agrios, “A Handbook on Judicial 
Dispute Resolution for Canadian Lawyers”, Version 1.1 (January 2004), online: CBA – 
Alberta <http://www.cba.org/alberta/PDF/JDR%20Handbook.pdf>.   
 
46 See e.g. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Family Mediation Services”, 
online: Ontario Government 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/family/mediation.asp>.  
 
47 See e.g. British Columbia Dispute Resolution Office, “Bulletin: Notice to Mediate, 
(General) Regulation” (June 2002), online: British Columbia Government 
<http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/publications/bulletins/general.htm>.  
 
48 Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25 at r. 24.1.01.  For judicial commentary 
on the purpose of R. 24.1, see e.g. Hagel v. Giles (2006), 80 O.R. (3d) 170 at paras. 27, 
34 (S.C.J.), aff’d (2006), 82 O.R. (3d) 470.  See also Dicaro v. Wong, [2001] O.J. No. 
347 (Master).  As is clear from the case law, courts are slow to exempt parties from these 
mandatory ADR requirements.  See e.g. O. (G.) v. H. (C.D.) (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 82 
(S.C.J.), discussed further infra at notes 165-166 and surrounding text. 
 
49 See e.g. Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 25 at rr. 77-78. 
 
50 See e.g. ibid. at r. 50. 
 
51 See e.g. ibid. at rr. 77.13(5)-(6), both of which sub-rules provide for the referral of “any 
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incentives built into typical Canadian fee-shifting cost rules provide 
parties with added legislatively-sanctioned court-based encouragement for 
private, non-trial-based settlements.52  Taken together, these are the sorts 
of civil justice tools that make up “all of the efforts over many years to 
encourage settlement between parties.”53 
C. OTHER COURTS 
Courts of statutory jurisdiction in Canada are also experimenting 
with significant reform initiatives, many of which – seeking the same 
reform goals of reduced cost and increased speed and efficiency – result in 
the privatization of their processes.  Small claims courts, for example, 
which have played an important role in the state’s goal of providing a just, 
cost-effective and accessible public venue for the resolution of many day-
to-day disputes in society,54 have for some years been experimenting with 
and implementing various alternative private process options.  Many of 
these initiatives include various case management and other ADR 
                                                 
52 See e.g. ibid. at r. 49. 
 
53 Hagel v. Giles, supra note 48 at para. 34, D. J. Power J. 
 
54 Small claims courts, according to Marvin Zuker, “originated in response to a 
perception that the complex and technical regular civil procedure made it virtually 
impossible for wage earners and small businessmen to use the court system to collect 
wages or accounts which they were owed.”  Marvin A. Zuker, Small Claims Court 
Practice (Toronto: Carswell, 1998) 2-3 [Small Claims Court Practice], in The Civil 
Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 27.  Key to the process is an effort to reduce delay by 
simplifying the process by which these disputes get resolved.  Badges of the small claims 
court system include less of a need for litigants to be represented by lawyers, more 
interventionist judges (able to assist the parties when necessary to narrow the issues and 
move through the trial process), relaxed rules of evidence and simplified rules of trial 
procedure.  See e.g. Small Claims Court Rules, O. Reg. 258/98, as amended.  See also 
Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General, “Small Claims Court Guides to Procedures”, 
online: Ontario Government 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/courts/guides/>.  In sum, according to 
Zuker, the “crux of the small claims procedure is informality and simplicity”.  Small 
Claims Court Practice, supra.  Informality, however, does not equal privacy.  The 
traditional small claims court model still contemplates an open, public dispute resolution 
process. 
 




(typically mediation-oriented) regimes.55  Other provincial inferior court 
initiatives include mediation and case management programs, often in 
family law cases.56  Similarly, at the federal court level, case management 
and ADR – primarily through the court’s “case management and dispute 
resolution services” program57 – have been implemented for some years 
now and are being actively pursued as tools to reduce backlog and 
eliminate “dead wood” proceedings from the court’s docket.58 
D. JUDGES, LAW SOCIETIES, BAR ASSOCIATIONS AND LAW 
SCHOOLS 
 In addition to government preferences59 that have led to these 
various court-based reform initiatives, there are numerous other players in 
the civil justice system that are also actively participating in and 
promoting the use of alternative – private – processes for resolving civil 
disputes.   
One of the most influential voices in this group of civil justice 
participants is that of judges.  Increasingly the courts are actively speaking 
up and encouraging parties to make use of out-of-court settlement 
processes, including mediation, negotiation (either directly or through 
lawyers), other ADR settlement processes and cost-based settlement 
                                                 
55 See e.g. Alberta Provincial Court: “Mediation and the Provincial Court”, online: 
Alberta Courts 
<http://www.albertacourts.ab.ca/pc/civil/publication/mediation_and_the_provincial_court
.htm>, British Columbia Dispute Resolution Office, “Bulletin: Court Mediation Program” 
(June 2002), online: <http://www.ag.gov.bc.ca/dro/publications/bulletins/court-
mediation.htm>.  See generally “Civil Justice Reform in Canada: 1996 to 2006 and 
Beyond”, supra note 32 at 31-32, The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 26-30. 
 
56 See e.g. Ontario Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 439/07, s. 40. 
 
57 See Federal Court Rules, SOR/2004-283, pt. 9, rr. 380-391.  
 
58 The Honourable Allan Lutfy, Swearing-in Ceremony, Associate Chief Justice (as he 
then was) (7 January 2000), online: Federal Court of Canada <http://cas-ncr-nter03.cas-
satj.gc.ca/portal/page/portal/fc_cf_en/Speech>. 
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incentives.60  For example, when speaking generally about resolving 
disputes out of court, Armstrong J.A. of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
stated that: “Settlement discussion is something which pervades, and 
should pervade, almost every lawsuit.”61  Similarly, Gonthier J. – when 
speaking about the modern, expansive role of the advocate – stated that: 
                                                 
60 Settlement through private means has become the norm, and not the exception, in the 
civil justice system.  Put simply: almost all disputes settle.  According to one source, the 
“vast majority [of cases]…are…resolved through a variety of related processes that have 
come to be grouped under the broad heading of ‘alternative dispute resolution…’”  The 
Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 525.  Further, as Paul Emond has noted, “the 
vast majority (95% to 98%) of disputes are resolved through negotiation and not 
adjudication”.  See “A Conceptual Overview”, supra note 31 at 3.  For further 
discussions of these trends, see e.g. Julie Macfarlane, “Why Do People Settle?” (2001) 46 
McGill L.J. 663 at 665, ALRI, Consultation Memorandum No. 12.6, “Promoting Early 
Resolution of Disputes by Settlement” (Edmonton: ALRI, July 2003), online: ALRI 
Homepage <http://www.law.ualberta.ca/alri/docs/cm12-6.pdf> at 8, n. 17, which 
indicates that the “current ratio of trials to filings in…Canadian and foreign jurisdictions” 
is “less tha[n] 2%.”  For a further discussion of these comments, see “Dispute Resolution, 
Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at n. 43.  Similarly, according 
to the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC), “As the empirical data…confirms, 
the vast majority of civil disputes commenced within the federal court and tribunal 
system are concluded by means other than formal adjudication…They are settled by 
negotiation or through other dispute resolution mechanisms (such as mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration)…”  ALRC, “Review of the Federal Civil Justice System”, 
Discussion Paper 62 (1999) at c. 3, para. 3.40 [footnotes omitted], online: ALRC 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/dp/62/>, discussed further in 
“Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at n. 44 
and surrounding text.  Estimates as to the way and at what stage of the process these 
disputes are resolved vary and are not precise.  However, at least one Ontario report 
found that “approximately 55% of cases commenced never proceed to the point where a 
statement of defence is filed” and the “remaining 45% of the case load proceeds through 
various additional stages of litigation, with the vast majority settling at some point 
between the pleading stage and the eve or morning of trial.”  Ontario Civil Justice 
Review, First Report (March 1995), online: Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General 
<http://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/about/pubs/cjr/> at c. 13, n. 47 and 
surrounding text, also in The Civil Litigation Process, supra note 20 at 529 (footnote 
omitted). 
 
61 Ristimaki v. Cooper (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 648 at para. 76 (C.A.) (QL).  For other 
judicial comments regarding settlement encouragement, see e.g. Heritage Duty Free Shop 
Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] B.C.J. No. 1208 at paras. 17-18 (S.C.) (QL), 
aff’d [2005] B.C.J. No. 670 (C.A.), Guelph Centre Partners Inc. v. Guelph Storm Ltd., 
[2005] O.J. No. 458 at para. 10 (S.C.J.) (QL).  See also the discussion of settlement in 




[C]ontrary to popular belief, not only will a good advocate 
not foment dissension and promote disputes between 
parties, he will seek to reconcile opposing interests in order 
to avoid the ultimate confrontation of a trial.  He will be 
called on to play the role of moderator, negotiator and 
conciliator.  Indeed, it is his duty to facilitate a rapid 
solution to disputes and to avoid fruitless or frivolous 
actions…Thus, whenever it is appropriate to do so, the 
advocate must discuss alternative dispute resolution 
methods (mediation, conciliation and arbitration) with his 
client, and must properly advise the client regarding the 
benefits of settling disputes.  He may also hold discussions 
with the opposing party and negotiate a resolution of the 
dispute between the parties.62 
 Taking the spirit of these statements seriously, lawyers are 
increasingly espousing the merits of ADR with their clients.  This opening 
up to settlement alternatives is occurring at one level as a practical – 
business-savvy – matter.  Lawyers are realizing the increased benefits for 
their clients in using ADR tools in terms of cost and time savings.  They 
are also increasingly discovering their own economic opportunities and 
benefits that can result from expanding their practice skills to include 
ADR tools.   
At another – professional – level, lawyers’ warming up to 
alternative, private settlement tools is also occurring as a matter of 
professional conduct.  For example, according to the Legal Ethics 
Handbook of the Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society,  
A lawyer has a duty to advise and encourage the client to 
settle a case rather than commence or continue legal 
                                                                                                                         
Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Ethics in Advocacy” in Alice Woolley, Brent Cotter and John 
Law, eds., Professional Responsibility in Canada (Toronto: LexisNexis, forthcoming).  
See further Rogacki v. Belz (2003), 67 O.R. (3d) 330 (C.A.), Rudd v. Trossacs 
Investments Inc. (2006), 79 O.R. (3d) 687 (Div. Ct.). 
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proceedings where the case can be settled fairly and 
reasonably. 
The lawyer should consider the appropriateness of alternate 
dispute resolution (ADR) to the resolution of issues in 
every case and, if appropriate, the lawyer should inform the 
client of ADR options and, if so instructed, take steps to 
pursue those options.63 
Similarly, bar associations are also actively encouraging the use of 
privatizing tools in the civil justice process through best practices 
statements64 and model codes of conduct.65  These moves have been 
clearly mandated for some time and have developed out of significant 
reform initiatives such as the “CBA Task Force Report”, which described 
the “adoption of a dispute resolution approach” to “litigation practice” as a 
“new professional obligation.”66 
Finally, law schools – following their United States counterparts as 
well as the recommendations in the “CBA Task Force Report” 
contemplating a “revolutionizing” of legal education toward the increased 
                                                 
63 Nova Scotia Barristers’ Society (NSBS), Legal Ethics Handbook, rr. 10.2-10.2A, 
online: NSBS <http://www.nsbs.org/legalethics/chapter10.htm> (footnote omitted). 
 
64 See e.g. CBA–British Columbia Branch, “Our Court System and Solving Disputes”, 
online: CBA–British Columbia Branch 
<http://www.cba.org/BC/public_media/lawyers/432.aspx>.  
 
65 For example, in a similar spirit to the settlement and ADR provisions of the NSBS’s 
Legal Ethics Handbook, supra note 63, the CBA’s Code of Professional Conduct 
provides that: “Whenever the case can be settled reasonably, the lawyer should advise 
and encourage the client to do so rather than commence or continue legal proceedings.  
The lawyer should consider the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) for every 
dispute and, if appropriate, the lawyer should inform the client of the ADR options and, if 
so instructed, take steps to pursue those options.”  CBA, Code of Professional Conduct, c. 
IX.8, online: CBA <http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/codeofconduct06.pdf> 
(footnote omitted). 
 
66 “CBA Task Force Report”, supra note 32 at 62-63.  For a discussion of these reforms 
and obligations, see “Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, 
supra note 8 at 750. 
 




treatment of ADR67 – have dramatically increased their focus on ADR and 
related courses and training.  As I have written elsewhere, 
The face of the legal academy, like other justice system 
stakeholders, has also changed over the past three decades.  
Included in this change are the teaching and research of 
dispute resolution, which have clearly taken on new and 
critical importance.  For example, in American law schools 
in 1976, “there was no subject category for ADR or 
mediation.”  In 1992, more than 94 percent of these schools 
offered dispute resolution courses.  And the trend did not 
stop then.  Since 1999, “the level of interest in dispute 
resolution – and in particular in the teaching of dispute 
resolution – has risen exponentially.”  A 2002 American 
commentary indicated that “more than 500 law professors 
identify themselves as teaching ADR.”  A similar 
“exponential[]” increase in dispute resolution teaching has 
occurred in Canada.  According to the “CBA Survey,” “it is 
clear that there is increased interest in and emphasis on 
[A]DR in all law schools.”68 
 Taken together, the expression of all of these voices and 
preferences – federal and provincial governments (expressed in the form 
of significant court reforms), judges, lawyers, law societies, bar 
associations, law schools and clients – has led to a clear and increasing 
privatization of much of the civil justice system. 
VI. ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM 
The second part of the public dispute resolution system that I focus 
on in this article is the administrative system, and in particular, 
privatization initiatives within federal and provincial administrative 
                                                 
67 See supra note 32. 
 
68 “Dispute Resolution, Access to Civil Justice and Legal Education”, supra note 8 at 
754-755 (citations omitted).  For further materials on the issue of ADR and legal 
education, see Trevor C. W. Farrow, “Dispute Resolution and Legal Education: A 
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processes.  In the same way that courts play a central role in our processes 
of democratic governance, so too do administrative regimes.  This role can 
be seen clearly in the mission statement of the Québec Human Rights 
Tribunal (QHRT), for example, which states that the QHRT “contributes 
in its own way, as part of the third pillar of government, to the building of 
an egalitarian society, with proper regard for the principles of fundamental 
justice and procedural fairness.”69 
Research for this part of the article involved searching hundreds of 
provincial and federal statutes and legislative provisions regarding 
administrative-based dispute resolution processes.  It also involved 
searching publicly-available materials for many of these regimes in search 
of information regarding non-statute-based materials on administrative 
dispute resolution processes that engage some privatization component.  
This research turned up hundreds of instances of the use of mediation, 
arbitration or other forms of ADR tools within administrative legislation 
databases (several of these instances are discussed below).70 
A. FEDERAL PROCESSES 
 There are many examples of federal administrative processes that 
actively encourage and engage various privatizing tools.71  For example, 
the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC), established pursuant to 
                                                 
69 QHRT, “The Human Rights Tribunal”, online: Québec Government 
<http://www.tribunaux.qc.ca/mjq_en/TDP/index-tdp.html>. 
 
70 Like with the privatization reforms in the civil justice system discussed above, 
reference must be made to the clear government preferences and policies – discussed 
supra part IV – that have also led to the inclusion of various privatizing tools in these 
administrative tribunal initiatives. 
 
71 As mentioned, numerous federal administrative regimes actively promote and employ 
privatizing initiatives as part of their dispute resolution processes.  In addition to those 
discussed in this part of this article, see e.g. the Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada, Immigration Appeal Division (IAD), “Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) 
Program Protocols” (amended 13 January 2003), online: Government of Canada 
<http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/en/references/legal/iad/adr/protoc_e.htm>, Canadian 
Transportation Agency, “Resolving Disputes Through Mediation”, online: Government 
of Canada <http://www.cta-otc.gc.ca/mediation/disputes/index_e.html#1/>. 
 




the Canadian Human Rights Act,72 has adopted a wide-ranging ADR 
program that actively promotes the simplification and privatization of 
many disputes brought to the CHRC.  According to the CHRC’s materials: 
The Commission actively promotes ADR with disputing 
parties and with other interested groups because it is timely 
and effective.  In February 2003, the Commission created 
the ADR Services Branch with a mandate to strengthen the 
service and actively promote it with stakeholders.  The 
Branch offers two forms of ADR: mediation and 
conciliation.73 
Within its former 1999 pilot project and now within its established 
ADR programs, which in 2005 were brought under the newly created 
Dispute Resolution Branch, the use of ADR has been quite wide-spread 
and reportedly successful.  According to its most recetly-available annual 
report, nearly half of the cases brought to the CHRC in 2006 were settled, 
mostly using a CHRC-appointed conciliator or mediator.74   
As is discussed further below,75 one of the important aspects of the 
CHRC’s approach to ADR is its recognition that not all cases are suitable 
for ADR.  However, notwithstanding this recognition, it maintains a clear 
preference for resolving many cases using one of its ADR resources.  As 
the CHRC states, “ADR is not the answer to every human rights issue but 
it is a healthier route to take than adjudication in many cases.”76 
                                                 
72 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 26. 
 
73 CHRC, “Overview: Alternative Dispute Resolution, What is ADR?”, online: 
Government of Canada <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/adr/what_is_it-en.asp>. 
 
74 CHRC, 2006 Annual Report at 7 (Resources, Publications, Reports: “Effectiveness of 
the Business Model”), online: Government of Canada <http://www.chrc-
ccdp.ca/publications/ar_2006_ra/page7-en.asp>. 
 
75 See infra notes 76 and 172 and surrounding text. 
 
76 CHRC, Overview, Alternative Dispute Resolution, “Why Use ADR?”, online: 
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There are many reasons cited for pursuing ADR, all of which are 
consistent with the general reasons behind most of the government and 
civil justice reform initiatives discussed above.77  For example, according 
to the CHRC, the “reasons to choose” ADR include that: it “works 
quickly”; is “confidential”; is “better for participants and their future 
relationships than confrontation and adjudication”; and the “participants 
set the agenda” and the “solutions”.78 
 Another example of a federal process that actively promotes the 
use of ADR tools is the Commission for Public Complaints Against the 
RCMP (CPC), which was established in 1988 by the Federal Government.  
The CPC is designed to provide a “civilian review” process regarding the 
conduct of members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).79  
According to the the CPC, it actively promotes the use of ADR for the 
resolution of complaints: 
Once the CPC analyst determines the relevant facts and 
understands the goals of the complainant, the analyst 
explains the citizen’s options for dealing with his or her 
concern.  In appropriate cases, the analyst invites the 
complainant and the RCMP to work together informally to 
resolve the complaint.  The complainant always retains the 
right to file a formal complaint. 
Where the complainant elects to resolve the complaint 
informally, the CPC analyst serves as a facilitator, helping 
the complainant obtain information by enlisting the aid of 
the senior RCMP officer in the jurisdiction where the 
problem arose.  When facilitating in this manner, the 
analyst provides the RCMP with a summary of the concern 
                                                 
77 Supra parts IV and V. 
 
78 CHRC, Overview, Alternative Dispute Resolution, “Why Use ADR?”, supra note 76. 
 
79 CPC, “Welcome”, online: Government of Canada <http://www.cpc-
cpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Home/index_e.aspx?ArticleID=1>.  
 




expressed by the complainant, normally on the same day 
that the citizen raises the concern.80 
Again, the merits of this process are well-known.  Speed, cost and 
efficiency are important justifications for the CPC’s use of alternative – 
more private – processes.  However, it is clear that the CPC and the 
RCMP, particularly given budgetary realities, encourage the use of ADR 
to enable them to deploy their energies on matters that they view as more 
pressing.  For example, according to the CPC:  
The informal resolution of complaints against members of 
the RCMP has been highly successful – the needs of 
complainants often can be addressed more quickly than 
through the formal process.  Informal resolution makes it 
possible for both the CPC and the RCMP to deploy scarce 
resources to higher priority work.81 
 Provided other endeavors are more pressing, of course that policy 
approach makes sense (assuming the intake analyst who first receives the 
complaint gets the complaint-channeling process correct).  However, to 
the extent that a case of significant public importance is run through the 
CPC’s ADR channel – because of a bad decision by an intake analyst, bad 
faith on the part of the RCMP or the CPC, or simply because of “scarce 
resources” that are deemed to be needed for “higher priority work” – 
concerns need to be raised.  These are the concerns of this article (that are 
further developed below).82  Given the active promotion of ADR by the 
CPC, it is clear that – like the CHRC – its strong preference, which is also 
in-line with the Federal Government’s stated preference,83 is to try to 
resolve disputes using ADR tools. 
                                                 




81 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 
82 See e.g. infra part IX. 
 
83 See e.g. supra part IV. 
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B. PROVINCIAL PROCESSES 
As with the federal administrative regime, provincial processes are 
increasingly promoting and employing privatizing initiatives as part of 
their dispute resolution systems.  Numerous examples were discovered in 
the research for this article.84   
As a preliminary matter, several provinces – including British 
Columbia and Ontario – have enacted administrative legislation of general 
application that allows for individual administrative regimes within those 
jurisdictions to create and administer ADR processes.  These legislative 
initiatives are clearly in-line – and are in fact motivated by – the overall 
government preferences in these and other jurisdictions to promote the use 
of privatized dispute resolution mechanisms.85  For example, according to 
the B.C. legislation, “The chair of the tribunal may appoint a member or 
staff of the tribunal or other persons to conduct a dispute resolution 
process.”86  Similarly in Ontario, tribunals are given broad authority to 
develop and administer privatizing ADR regimes, including mandatory 
regimes.  According to the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, 
A tribunal may make rules…classifying the types of 
proceedings that come before it and setting guidelines as to 
the procedural steps or processes (such as…alternative 
dispute resolution mechanisms, expedited hearings) that 
apply to each type of proceeding and the circumstances in 
which other procedures may apply… 
                                                                                                                         
 
84 In addition to the tribunal processes discussed below, see e.g. the Alberta Energy and 
Utilities Board (“AEUB”), “What about Appropriate Dispute Resolution?” online: AEUB 
<http://www.eub.gov.ab.ca/bbs/public/adr/ADRPamphlet.pdf>. 
 
85 Discussed further supra part IV. 
 
86 Administrative Tribunals Act, S.B.C. 2004, c. 45, s. 28(1). 
 




A rule…may provide that participation in an alternative 
dispute resolution mechanism is mandatory or that it is 
mandatory in certain specified circumstances.87 
Of particular interest to the arguments presented in this article are 
tribunals that deal with significant public interest values and resources.  
One area of particular focus – in which these sorts of ADR mechanisms 
have been put in place – includes the various provincial human rights 
tribunal regimes.  For example, the Manitoba Human Rights Commission 
(MHRC) “encourages” the use of ADR processes as part of its overall 
dispute resolution process.88  Similarly, the B.C. Human Rights Tribunal 
(BCHRT) offers various forms of “off the record”89 ADR settlement 
processes including mediation, early evaluation, structured negotiation and 
final determinations on the merits.90 
The policy reasons behind the BCHRT initiatives, again, include 
speed, simplicity (often including reduced costs) and privacy.  
Specifically, according to the BCHRT, parties “may be interested in a 
settlement meeting for a number of reasons.  Settlement meetings are often 
the quickest and simplest method of resolving disputes, and they are 
confidential.  If there is a settlement, there will not be a public hearing.”91  
Similar policy “advantages” are identified as part of the ADR-based 
settlement initiatives of the Alberta Human Rights and Citizenship 
                                                 
87 R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, ss. 4.7, 4.8(4). 
 
88 MHRC, Annual Report 2005 at 9 (“Complaint Process – Overview: Mediation”), 
online: Manitoba Government <http://www.gov.mb.ca/hrc/english/publications/annual-
reports/annual-report-05.pdf>. 
 
89 BCHRT, “Guide 4 – The Settlement Meeting” at 2, online: B.C. Government 
<http://www.bchrt.bc.ca/guides_and_information_sheets/guides/Guide4_2005.pdf>.  
 
90 Ibid. at 1. 
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Commission (AHRCC)92 and the Nova Scotia Human Rights Commission 
(NSHRC).  For example, according to the NSHRC:  
While information from a Human Rights Board of Inquiry 
hearing is made public, information exchanged during 
settlement initiatives is kept confidential.  This allows 
participants of settlement initiatives to discuss their 
situation openly and candidly without fear of 
repercussion.93 
Other provincial administrative bodies that deal with significant 
public resource issues include environmental protection tribunals.  Again, 
in this segment of the administrative process, significant privatizing 
initiatives have been put in place.  For example, the Alberta 
Environmental Appeals Board (AEAB) – an independent body that 
reviews decisions regarding development approval, water licenses, 
reclamation certificates and enforcement orders94 – actively encourages 
ADR.  According to its materials, the AEAB “places a high value on its 
mediation program and encourages participants to use mediation as the 
primary way to resolve appeals that come before the Board.”95 
In addition to its policy statements, the AEAB’s preference for 
resolving disputes through its ADR process can also be seen from its 
                                                 
92 The AHRCC regime includes a “conciliation” process, which specifically provides the 
parties to a complaint with a “without prejudice” (confidential) dispute resolution 
alternative.  AHRCC, Publications and Resources, Complaint Process, “Conciliation”, 
online: Alberta Government 
<http://www.albertahumanrights.ab.ca/publications/Information_Sheets/Text/Info_Compl
aint_Process.asp>.   
 
93 NSHRC, “Introduction to Settlement Initiatives”, online: Nova Scotia Government 
<http://www.gov.ns.ca/humanrights/PDFdocs/Settlement_E.pdf>.  Other provinces with 
human rights tribunal regimes that employ similar kinds of private ADR process include 
New Brunswick, Newfoundland and Labrador, Ontario (see further infra notes 173-179 
and surrounding text), P.E.I. and Saskatchewan. 
 
94 AEAB, “Welcome”, online: Alberta Government 
<http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/index.htm>.  
 
95 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 




settlement statistics.  For example, according to the AEAB’s mediation 
information: 
From April 1, 2004 to March 31, 2005, the Board held 18 
mediations, all of which were successfully resolved, 
resulting in a 100 percent success rate for this reporting 
year.  Since the Board’s inception in 1993, it has conducted 
139 mediations with 116 being successfully resolved.  This 
reflects an overall success rate of 83 percent.96 
Similar environmental assessment and protection issues are dealt 
with by the Ontario Environmental Review Tribunal (OERT), which also 
actively deploys ADR techniques for the resolution of disputes.  For 
example, according to the OERT: 
Mediation is offered to all parties (except in matters under 
the Niagara Escarpment Planning and Development Act, 
and Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, 2001) and is 
conducted after the preliminary hearing and generally 30 
days prior to the commencement of the main hearing…The 
Tribunal [in 2007-2008] will continue to offer these 
services in every appeal and, upon request, in all 
applications filed in order to encourage parties to resolve 
their issues.97 
                                                 
96 AEAB, 2004-2005 Annual Report at 24 (“Mediation Program”), online: Alberta 
Government <http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/pub/2004-05-AR.pdf>.  By comparison, the 
settlement rates using these sorts of ADR-based processes in the human rights tribunal 
context are moderate to strong.  For example, according to the AHRCC, more than 50 
percent (394 complaints) of the 749 complaints that were resolved in the 2005-2006 year 
(of a total of 778 complaint files opened) were resolved using the AHRCC’s conciliation 
process.  AHRCC, Annual Review, April 1, 2005-March 31, 2006 at 10 (“Conciliated 
files”), online: Alberta Government 
<http://www.albertahumanrights.ab.ca/publications/Annual_Review/Ann_Rev_05-
06.pdf>.  Almost 60 percent were resolved that way the previous year at the AHRCC.  
Ibid. 
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 Further, even after an initial settlement attempt, or if “parties 
choose not to participate” following the preliminary hearing, mediation 
services “are offered by the Tribunal throughout the Hearing process, upon 
request.”98  Because a “number of the Tribunal Members are certified to 
conduct mediation”,99 it is clear – even at the hearing stage – that 
mediation is actively considered and promoted by the OERT. 
C. SETTLEMENTS INVOLVING MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
 Notwithstanding policy-based provisions in various tribunal 
regimes that often encourage or require mattes of “public interest” to 
proceed to a tribunal hearing,100 or at least to be resolved pursuant to 
public interest values,101 there are numerous cases being settled using 
private ADR tools that involve matters of significant public interest and 
importance that receive little or no public scrutiny or attention.   
Some of these settlements involve matters that are discontinued 
and not pursued at all through either the formal or informal tribunal 
processes.102  Nothing further may be heard of these matters.  Of those that 
do continue into the system, many are resolved based on confidential 
processes and are only reported on in a very summary fashion, if at all, in 
the tribunal’s public materials.  For example, private settlements at the 
tribunal level have recently involved matters of public interest such as: 
subsidized housing discrimination;103 physical disability and gender 
                                                 
98 OERT, Annual Report, April 1, 2005-March 31, 2006 at 4 (“Mediation”), online: 
Ontario Government <http://www.ert.gov.on.ca/>. 
 
99 OERT, 2007-2010 Business Plan at 4 (“Mediation”), supra note 97. 
 
100 See e.g. AEAB, “About Mediation: When is Mediation not Appropriate?”, online: 
Alberta Government <http://www.eab.gov.ab.ca/mediation_about.htm>.  See also infra 
notes 106 and 172 and surrounding text. 
 
101 See e.g. CHRC, Overview, Alternative Dispute Resolution, “Why Use ADR?”, supra 
note 76.  See also infra notes 171-172 and surrounding text. 
 
102 See e.g. AEAB, 2004-2005 Annual Report at 36, supra note 96. 
 
103 See e.g. MHRC, Annual Report 2005 at 11, supra note 88. 




discrimination, often in the context of employment and services;104 
significant complaints about police mistreatment involving potential 
discrimination of members of First Nations;105 environmental protection 
matters;106 and immigration matters.107  It is the public interest aspect of 
these privatized settlements that also brings these administrative tribunal-
based ADR initiatives within the scope of the concerns developed further 
below in this article.108 
VII. NON-COURT OR TRIBUNAL-BASED LEGISLATIVE 
ADR PROCESSES 
 The third aspect of the public dispute resolution system that I focus 
on in this article is the growing and increasingly important aspect of the 
system that lies in between the formal state-sanctioned court and 
administrative regime-annexed privatization initiatives discussed in the 
previous two parts of this article and the purely private realm of dispute 
resolution processes that occur everyday completely outside of the state’s 
influence.  It is this third aspect of the system that was also fully engaged 
in the Dealership case.109 
What I am specifically talking about in this part of the article 
typically involves arbitration processes that are set up pursuant to 
agreements between individuals or private entities but that are, at the same 
                                                                                                                         
 
104 See e.g. AHRCC, Annual Review, April 1, 2005-March 31, 2006 at viii (“Resolution 
and adjudication of human rights complaints: summary of results”), supra note 96.  
 
105 See e.g. CPC, 2006-2007 Annual Report, “Appendix 3: Informal Resolution of 
Complaints”, online: Government of Canada <http://www.cpc-
cpp.gc.ca/DefaultSite/Reppub/index_e.aspx?articleid=1439#8>. 
 
106 See e.g. AEAB, 2004-2005 Annual Report at 36, supra note 96. 
 
107 See e.g. IAD, “Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Program Protocols” (amended 
13 January 2003), online: Government of Canada <http://www.irb-
cisr.gc.ca/en/references/legal/iad/adr/protoc_e.htm> 
 
108 See infra part IX. 
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time, enabled by federal110 or provincial arbitration111 or mediation 
statutes.112  They are, as such, hybrid processes in the sense that they are 
partly public regimes given the enabling and sanctioning legislation 
pursuant to which they receive many of their powers.  And they are partly 
private regimes in the sense that they are initiated by private agreement 
and, once underway, they also allow parties essentially free reign to 
conduct proceedings that are fully private and largely out of reach of all 
state actors (including the courts).  Perhaps the most convenient 
recognition of this form of “privatization” is a recent minority judgment of 
Bastarache and LeBel JJ. of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
Exclusive arbitration clauses operate to create a “private 
jurisdiction” that implicates the loss of jurisdiction of state-
appointed forums for dispute resolution, such as ordinary 
courts and administrative tribunals, rendering contractual 
arbitration both different and exclusive of the later 
entities…Contractual arbitration has also been described as 
creating a “private justice system” for the parties:…“From 
a theoretical standpoint, arbitration is a private justice 
system that ordinarily arises out of an agreement.  Thus, it 
has a contractual source and an adjudicative function”… 
What makes contractual arbitration a “private jurisdiction” 
or “private justice system” is the degree of freedom the 
parties have in choosing the manner in which their dispute 
will be resolved: 
Arbitration is therefore the settling of 
disputes between parties who agree not to go 
before the courts, but to accept as final the 
decision of experts of their choice, in a place 
of their choice, usually subject to laws 
agreed upon in advance and usually under 
                                                 
110 See Commercial Arbitration Act, R.S.C. 1985 (2nd Supp.), c. 17. 
 
111 See e.g. Alberta Arbitration Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-43. 
 
112 See Nova Scotia Commercial Mediation Act, S.N.S. 2005, c. 36. 
 




rules which avoid much of the formality, 
niceties, proof and procedure required by the 
courts…113 
By way of background, the introduction and establishment of the 
arbitral system in Canada – which largely tracks historic international 
commercial arbitration developments – has also been recently summarized 
by Deschamps J. of the Supreme Court of Canada: 
International arbitration law is strongly influenced by two 
texts drafted under the auspices of the United Nations:  the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (“New York 
Convention”), and the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 
(1985) (“Model Law”). 
The New York Convention entered into force in 1959.  
Article II of the Convention provides that a court of a 
contracting state that is seized of an action in a matter 
covered by an arbitration clause must refer the parties to 
arbitration.  At present, 142 countries are parties to the 
Convention.  The accession of this many countries is 
evidence of a broad consensus in favour of the institution of 
arbitration…Canada acceded to the New York Convention 
on May 12, 1986. 
The Model Law is another fundamental text in the area of 
international commercial arbitration.  It is a model for 
legislation that the UN recommends that states take into 
consideration in order to standardize the rules of 
international commercial arbitration.  The Model Law was 
                                                 
113 Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, supra note 9 at paras. 132-
133 (references omitted).  See further ibid. at para. 200, at which Bastarache and 
LeBel JJ. state that “the effect of exclusive arbitration clauses is to create a ‘private 
jurisdiction’ that implicates the loss of jurisdiction of state-appointed authorities for 
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drafted in a manner that ensured consistency with the 
New York Convention… 
The final text of the Model Law was adopted on June 21, 
1985 by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”).  In its explanatory note on the 
Model Law, the UNCITRAL Secretariat states that it: 
…reflects a worldwide consensus on the 
principles and important issues of 
international arbitration practice.  It is 
acceptable to States of all regions and the 
different legal or economic systems of the 
world.   
(Explanatory Note by the UNCITRAL 
secretariat on the Model Law on 
International Commercial Arbitration, at 
para. 2) 
In 1986, Parliament enacted the Commercial Arbitration 
Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 17 (2nd Supp.), which was based on 
the Model Law…114 
 Provincial arbitration legislation has similarly been enacted across 
Canada that also reflects this widespread acceptance of the policies and 
practices of this world-wide dispute resolution process.115  Key 
components of arbitration legislation typically include: broad subject 
matter coverage; significant ability to vary many provisions of the 
legislation; limited court intervention; wide procedural flexibility; binding 
                                                 
114 Ibid. at paras. 38-41, Deschamps J. (majority). 
 
115 See e.g. supra note 111. 
 




awards; limited appeal rights; powers of enforcement; and powers to 
award costs.116  In short, once commenced: 
…arbitration is a creature that owes its existence to the will 
of the parties alone…the parties to an arbitration agreement 
are free, subject to any mandatory provisions by which they 
are bound, to choose any place, form and procedures they 
consider appropriate…The choice of procedure does not 
alter the institution of arbitration in any of these cases.  The 
rules become those of the parties, regardless of where they 
are taken from.117 
Of particular significance to typical arbitrating parties, and to this 
article, is the overwhelming purpose of arbitration legislation to provide 
parties with a powerful, flexible, and confidential dispute resolution 
process that is largely out of the reach of the public court system.  This 
underlying policy principle can be seen in the many legislative debates 
that led to the development of these regimes.  For example, according to 
legislative debates regarding Ontario’s arbitration legislation: 
The purpose of the Arbitration Act, 1991, is to provide a 
framework for the private settlement of disputes that will 
be as clear as possible for those who use it, while 
preserving the fairness of the process.  The ability of an 
unwilling party to delay or derail an arbitration has been 
reduced to a minimum.  The parties are generally free to set 
their own rules for arbitrations – that is, to override the act 
– so they have a great deal of flexibility.  However, the law 
and the courts will ensure that the parties stick to their 
                                                 
116 See e.g. Alberta Arbitration Act, supra note 111 at ss. 2, 3, 6, 20, 37, 44-45, 48, 49 and 
53. 
 
117 Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, supra note 9 at paras. 51-
52, Deschamps J. (majority).  See further ibid. at para. 133, Bastarache and LeBel 
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agreement to arbitrate, do not proceed unfairly, and abide 
by the result when it is given.118 
Further policy debates leading to the enactment of these powerful 
legislative tools belie many legislators’ intentions to increase the use of 
arbitration as a way to off-set the use of public resources in resolving 
certain civil matters as well as some legislators’ views that arbitration 
should even be mandated for some commercial circumstances.  These 
sentiments can be seen, for example, in the following statements in the 
debates leading up to amendments to Manitoba’s arbitration legislation:  
We on this side acknowledge the value of arbitration as a 
way to resolve disputes.  Arbitration usually costs less to 
the disputing parties.  At least, we recognize that it can cut 
down on some costly legal costs and pretrial procedures.  It 
certainly costs less to the taxpaying public, because the 
expensive judicial system is not called on to resolve the 
disputes.  Arbitration is often, although not always – but 
usually faster than litigation.  It is also informal, accessible 
and flexible, which meet the needs of the parties to a 
greater extent than formal litigation.  Of course, arbitration 
also allows privacy.  It is confidential, as long as one of the 
parties does not pursue an appeal. 
It is clear that arbitration does have a very important role in 
our society and, indeed, it is my firm belief that we should 
rely more on alternative dispute resolution.  We should be 
looking for not only a greater reliance on arbitration but 
other ways of resolving disputes outside of the courts.  
 
I think one of the greatest arguments to support my belief is 
that when there are limited resources to deal with conflicts 
between individuals and limited resources to deal with 
                                                 
118 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), (5 November 
1991) at 1550 (Hon. Howard Hampton) (emphasis added). 
 




Criminal Code infractions, we have to think why are we 
putting so many resources into the resolution of disputes 
between, for example, two large corporations that may have 
extensive resources and, yet, are going head to head in a 
battle over many years…We really, I think, have to think in 
larger terms about how we are using public resources to 
solve disputes between certain kinds of parties and, in that 
regard, I wonder if we should not be looking toward a more 
affirmative statement or a more effective way of getting 
parties to use arbitration as an alternative to civil litigation, 
including requiring arbitration clauses in certain 
commercial contracts.119 
The freedom and power that are clearly provided by these 
legislative regimes has made arbitration increasingly popular, particularly 
as a method to resolve commercial disputes.  In the United States, for 
example, reports indicate that total case filings for the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA) dramatically increased over the 10 year 
period from 1993 to 2003 (from over 60,000 cases in 1993 to over 230,000 
cases in 2003).120  In Canada, ADR – specifically including arbitration – is 
a similarly favoured dispute resolution regime, particularly within the 
corporate sector.  For example, a number of significant corporate entities 
and leading Canadian law firms have signed the ADR Institute of 
Canada’s “Dispute Resolution Pledge”, which “commits signatories to 
willingly consider and suggest alternative dispute resolution processes in 
appropriate situations prior to turning to the courts.”121 
                                                 
119 Manitoba, Legislative Assembly, Official Report of Debates (Hansard), Vol. XLVII, 
No. 59, Orders of the Day (11 June 1997) at 1520 (Hon. Gord Mackintosh). 
 
120 Reported in Thomas J. Stipanowich, “ADR and the ‘Vanishing Trial’: The Growth 
and Impact of ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’” (2004) 1 J. Emp. Leg. Stud. 843 at 872. 
 
121 ADR Institute of Canada, Rules & Pledges, “Dispute Resolution Pledge: A Corporate 
Policy Statement”, online: ADR Institute of Canada <http://www.amic.org/>.  For a list 
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Further, not only is arbitration increasingly popular, it is also in 
large measure fully recognized as an established part of (or alternative to) 
the overall civil justice system.  This recognition starts at the top of our 
Canadian court system.  For example, according to LeBel J.: 
In general, arbitration is not part of the state’s judicial 
system, although the state sometimes assigns powers or 
functions directly to arbitrators.  Nonetheless, arbitration is 
still, in a broader sense, a part of the dispute resolution 
system the legitimacy of which is fully recognized by the 
legislative authorities.122 
 
 Taking this recognition of arbitration one step further, Bastarache 
and LeBel JJ. of the Supreme Court of Canada recently recognized the 
further policy of legislatures, building on Desputeaux, which “now accepts 
arbitration as a valid form of dispute resolution and, moreover, seeks to 
promote its use.”123  One primary method by which the court has promoted 
the use of arbitration is through its deferential approach to arbitration 
challenges, which it recently confirmed as follows:  
It is…well established that the effect of a valid undertaking 
to arbitrate is to remove the dispute from the jurisdiction of 
the ordinary courts of law…There is consequently no 
question that, if the arbitration agreement is valid and 
relates to the dispute, the Superior Court has no jurisdiction 
to hear the case and must refer the parties to arbitration.124 
 
                                                 
122 Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) inc., 2003 SCC 17, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 
178 at para. 41. 
 
123 Dell Computer Corp. v. Union des consommateurs, supra note 9 at para. 143 
(emphasis added). 
 
124 Ibid. at para. 150, Bastarache and LeBel JJ. 
 




In addition to recognizing the well-established nature of valid 
contractual agreements to arbitrate, the Court has also recently confirmed 
that it will only disrupt the jurisdiction of an arbitrator in limited 
circumstances.125 
VIII. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR PRIVATE JUSTICE 
The justifications for these privatizing trends – typically spoken of 
in terms of benefits – are well documented and include: efficiency in terms 
of time, money and resource management; the reduction of backlogs and 
costs; increased access to a dispute resolution system; the maintenance of 
individual (and community) relationships through improved dialogue, 
tailored outcomes and voluntary compliance with results; freedom to 
choose laws, processes and decision-makers; improved public satisfaction 
with dispute resolution regimes; and, of course, protection from public 
scrutiny through rules of confidentiality.126 
                                                 
125 According to Deschamps J.: 
First of all, I would lay down a general rule that in any case 
involving an arbitration clause, a challenge to the arbitrator’s 
jurisdiction must be resolved first by the arbitrator.  A court should 
depart from the rule of systematic referral to arbitration only if the 
challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is based solely on a question of 
law… 
If the challenge requires the production and review of factual 
evidence, the court should normally refer the case to arbitration, as 
arbitrators have, for this purpose, the same resources and expertise as 
courts.  Where questions of mixed law and fact are concerned, the court 
hearing the referral application must refer the case to arbitration unless 
the questions of fact require only superficial consideration of the 
documentary evidence in the record. 
Before departing from the general rule of referral, the court must 
be satisfied that the challenge to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction is not a 
delaying tactic and that it will not unduly impair the conduct of the 
arbitration proceeding.  This means that even when considering one of 
the exceptions, the court might decide that to allow the arbitrator to rule 
first on his or her competence would be best for the arbitration process. 
Ibid. at paras. 84-86.  See also Rogers Wireless Inc. v. Muroff, 2007 SCC 35 at para. 
11. 
 
126 See “Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System”, supra note 8 at 16.  See also 
“Critiques of Settlement Advocacy”, supra note 8 at 292-293, citing S. B. Goldberg, 
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In large measure, a significant underlying theme of many of these 
benefits sounds in the principle of efficiency, which has come essentially 
to define the modern discourse surrounding our civil justice systems.  As 
Héctor Fix-Fierro has noticed: 
[E]fficiency…has penetrated the legal and judicial systems 
at all levels and dimensions, from the level of society as a 
whole to the day-to-day operation of the judicial process, 
from the institutional role performed by adjudication in 
society to the organisational context of judicial 
decisions…In other words: far from being an alien value 
with respect to the legal and judicial process, efficiency has 
simply become an inseparable part of the structure of 
expectations we address to the legal system.127 
This efficiency-based argument, as I have summarized elsewhere, 
essentially proceeds as follows: 
When a dispute involves the private rights of A v. B, and 
further, when two “consenting adults” (including 
corporations) have chosen to move their dispute off the 
busy docket of our public court system and into the private 
boardroom of an arbitrator or mediator, current views 
suggest that justice is being served.  The argument is that 
the resolution of disputes – like other goods and services – 
should not be deprived of the benefits of freedom of 
                                                                                                                         
Frank E. A. Sander & N. H. Rogers, Dispute Resolution: Negotiation, Mediation, and 
Other Processes (New York: Aspen Law and Business, 1999) at 8. 
 
127 Héctor Fix-Fierro, Courts, Justice and Efficiency: A Socio-Legal Study of Economic 
Rationality in Adjudication (Oxford and Portland: Hart Publishing, 2003) at 235 (footnote 
omitted) [Courts, Justice and Efficiency].  Note, however, that Fix-Fierro further 
comments that “economic rationality is not, and should not necessarily be, the prevalent 
value or the overriding concern in the context of legal decision-making.”  Ibid. 
 




movement and contract in an efficiency-seeking, innovative 
and expanding market economy.128 
An example of this form of argument is articulated by Gillian 
Hadfield, who has forcefully advocated for the privatization of law – 
particularly commercial law – in the overall spirit of “significantly 
decreasing the cost of law.”129  This argument is also similar to that raised 
by the Honourable Gord Mackintosh, for example, in the legislative 
debates surrounding Manitoba’s arbitration legislation.130  Hadfield – 
although recognizing that the justice system plays several important public 
roles in our modern democracies including protecting “individual rights” – 
argues that when it comes to commercial law, the state should download – 
privatize – much of its dispute resolution functions: 
…the legal system…performs important economic 
functions such as providing the structure and regulation 
necessary for the operation of efficient markets.  The 
economic sphere of law regularly deals with relationships 
that involve only corporate entities.  Private legal regimes 
could provide this law without raising legitimacy 
concerns.131 
Hadfield summarizes the basis for her argument as follows:  
The rules we want in these interactions [involving 
corporate entities] are the rules that promote and facilitate 
                                                 
128 See “Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System”, supra note 8 at 16.  For a further 
discussion of ADR’s purported efficiencies, see Courts, Justice and Efficiency, supra 
note 127 at 123-125, 131-135.  See also Colleen M. Hanycz, “More Access to Less 
Justice: Efficiency, Proportionality and Costs in Canadian Civil Justice Reform” (2008) 
27 C.J.Q. 98 [“More Access to Less Justice”]. 
 
129 Gillian K. Hadfield, “Privatizing Commercial Law” (2001) 42:1 Regulation 40 at 40 
[“Privatizing Commercial Law”], online: Cato Institute 
<http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv24n1/hadfield.pdf>. 
 
130 See supra note 119 and surrounding text. 
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efficient market relationships between corporations.  In this 
setting, we are not interested in what is fair or just between 
two corporations; we are interested in what makes their 
economic relationship as productive and valuable as 
possible.  That goal suggests the need to look for ways to 
increase the role of markets in the process of developing 
and administering the legal regimes that govern the 
relationships between corporate entities.132 
Hadfield’s argument rests essentially on four points: corporate 
relationships are different than relationships involving “individual rights”; 
the public need not be interested in the fairness of corporate relationships; 
cost reduction can be achieved through efficiency-seeking private dispute 
resolution mechanisms; and we should ultimately be guided by principles 
of efficiency – not what is “fair or just” – when making fundamental 
procedural policy choices in the context of commercial dispute 
resolution.133 
Clearly saving time, money, relationships and reputations, while at 
the same time increasing market efficiencies are typically good things.  
And if one-off dispute resolution statistics and results were the only 
relevant factors by which to measure a dispute resolution regime, 
particularly involving corporate entities, the discussion would essentially 
be over.  Unfortunately, this narrow – litigant-based – perspective is what 
currently drives much of our public policy thinking and choices.  For 
example, when debating the addition of ADR into the B.C. Administrative 
Tribunals Act,134 one Member of Parliament argued that:  
What citizens want more often than not is an outcome and a 
result rather than a process.  They want their problems 
solved.  They want the relationship improved, they want the 
                                                 
132 Ibid.  Not only does Hadfield contemplate the privatization of the procedural aspects 
of corporate dispute resolution, she also advocates for the privatization of substantive 
corporate law development.  See ibid. at 41. 
 
133 Ibid. at 40. 
 
134 Supra note 86. 
 




benefit they believe they’re entitled to, and they want 
government to stop doing what it is that is harming them.135 
 As such, according to the same Member of Parliament,  
Anything we can do to move forward dispute resolution so 
that it happens sooner is, in my view, a step in the right 
direction, and we are doing a lot as government to try to 
encourage alternative dispute resolution not just in the 
administrative justice system but across the justice system 
as a whole.  In fact, part of rethinking justice involves 
rethinking the idea of alternative dispute resolution so that 
it is no longer alternative but, rather, so that mediation, 
settlement, conciliation and settlement conferences are all 
part of the basic tools of all dispute resolution…136 
 The problem, however, is that while individuals and corporate 
citizens do often care about the individual outcome of their case rather (or 
at least typically more) than the process; when we think about the justice 
system as a whole, process is fundamental to an overall viable public 
justice system.  Arguments that focus purely on efficiency or purely on 
individual, one-off interests lose this overall societal perspective.  As is 
discussed in the next part of this article, there is clearly more going on in 
dispute resolution regimes (including at the commercial level) than simply 
the resolution of one-off disputes.  The fundamental and just regulation of 
society is at stake.  And unlike Hadfield, I am strongly of the view that the 
state should maintain not only a strong interest in the resolution of 
disputes involving “the lives and relationships of its citizens”; it should 
also do so in the context of disputes involving “corporate-to-corporate 
commercial dealings.”137 
                                                 
135 British Columbia, Legislative Assembly, Hansard, Vol. 25, No. 15 (18 May 2004) at 
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IX. CONCERNS ABOUT PRIVATIZATION 
First, as a threshold matter, even the many stated efficiency-related 
benefits of ADR are not without their doubters.  For example, some 
studies have shown that purported reductions in cost and increases in 
speed and efficiency are not always present in court-annexed ADR 
processes, and in any event, do not always militate in favour of increased 
efficiency of courts to which those ADR processes are annexed.138  But 
even if we assume these benefits to obtain – and it is the case that they 
often (although certainly not always) do – there are still remaining 
fundamental concerns that need to be seriously considered and discussed. 
A. IMPOVERISHED DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON LAW 
 Critics of ADR and privatization point to the potential slow decline 
in the number of precedents created and the resulting erosion of the overall 
corpus of the common law as a result of ADR’s popularity.  An early but 
still authoritative example of this critique comes from Owen Fiss, who 
raised the concern that widespread settlement strategies would negatively 
impact the court’s ability, particularly appellate courts in public interest 
litigation, to develop the common law.139  Tracy Walters McCormack has 
also – more recently – raised similar concerns.140  Eroding the sources of 
common law is clearly a concern, particularly given the current force and 
trajectory of privatizing trends.  
B. LACK OF PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
A second concern raised by critics of ADR and privatization 
involves ADR’s procedural protections, or potential lack thereof.  Clearly 
one of the main benefits of ADR, as was expressly recognized, for 
example, in the 1991 legislative debates surrounding Ontario’s arbitration 
legislation, is its wide-ranging flexibility, whereby parties are “generally 
                                                 
138 Courts, Justice and Efficiency, supra note 127 at 200-203, 236. 
 
139 See Owen Fiss, “Against Settlement” (1984) 93 Yale L.J. 1073.  For a recent 
discussion of Fiss’ critique, see “Critiques of Settlement Advocacy”, supra note 8 at 278-
287. 
 
140 “Privatizing the Justice System”, supra note 1 at pt. vi. 
 




free to set their own rules…so they have a great deal of flexibility.”141  
However, with flexibility comes a potential significant cost.  Specifically, 
my concern here, as I have argued elsewhere, is that without adequate 
public scrutiny, primarily through open court processes and the 
publication of precedents, there is a real danger that parties, particularly 
including those with power, will use the private system to circumvent 
public policies, accountability and basic notions of procedural fairness.142 
 These concerns about power and procedural fairness were clearly 
central to the debates surrounding Ontario’s recent amendments to its 
arbitration legislation in the area of family law.  Because I have written 
elsewhere on this subject, I will only very briefly develop it further 
here.143  In a nutshell, prior to 2006, parties could use Ontario’s 
Arbitration Act, 1991 for the resolution of a wide variety of disputes, 
including family law disputes.  In so doing, they could essentially contract 
out of the application of progressive substantive and procedural family law 
protections.  Recently, the Ontario Government – following significant 
public debate regarding the use of Ontario’s arbitration legislation to 
sanction faith-based dispute resolution processes that potentially 
discriminated against women and children – sought to limit those 
opportunities through amendments to its arbitration legislation contained 
in the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006 (FSLAA).144  The results 
of the amendments essentially were to exclude family disputes from the 
benefits of arbitration legislation unless the process employed by the 
parties complied with “the law of Ontario or another Canadian 
jurisdiction…”145 
                                                 
141 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, (5 November 1991) at 1550 (Hon. Howard Hampton), 
supra note 118. 
 
142 “Privatizing our Public Civil Justice System”, supra note 8 at 16. 
 
143 For my earlier comments, see “Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate”, supra note 
8. 
 
144 S.O. 2006, c. 1. 
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 This move by the Ontario Government was clearly made given the 
obvious public interest issues engaged in family law disputes, and in 
particular, gender, religious, child-welfare and community-welfare 
interests.  There is no doubt, as Hadfield would likely argue,146 that these 
important values are typically much more clearly identified as public 
interest values than those involving the rights and interests of corporations 
and other private actors in non-family settings.  However, there are 
certainly occasions when the issues at stake in corporate or other private 
law disputes warrant significant public scrutiny.  And in those cases, in my 
view, the public interest should be engaged through active public scrutiny 
of private proceedings.  As such, unlike Hadfield (as I argue above147), 
justice is engaged not just when the rights of citizens are involved, but also 
– often – when the rights of corporations are involved. 
 Here is where we arrive back at the relevance of the Dealership 
case to the arguments in this article.  Because in the Dealership case, I 
experienced – first-hand – numerous violations of basic procedural 
protections that militated to the significant detriment of John.  For 
example, on one occasion, after repeated deposition requests for a series of 
documents and repeated denials by the Corporation’s lawyers about their 
existence or relevance, a witness for the Corporation inadvertently 
(although properly) disclosed the fact that the documents – with 
knowledge of their lawyers – were in the trunk of his car that was parked 
just outside of the office in which the deposition was taking place.  After a 
break to retrieve the documents (which turned out to be clearly relevant), it 
became clear that the lawyers for the Corporation were actively trying to 
conceal the existence of these documents, which contained several 
problematic statements relating to the corporate structure of the 
Corporation that undermined their theory of the case. 
On another occasion, during a deposition of a different officer of 
the Corporation, my line of cross-examination questions was interrupted 
by counsel for the Corporation, who proceeded to insist on taking a break 
“to speak to [his]…witness”.  After the break, the witness returned to the 
                                                 
146 See “Privatizing Commercial Law”, supra note 129. 
 
147 Supra note 137 and surrounding text. 
 




room and started to answer my questions with a very different, much less 
forthcoming demeanour.  He then quickly lost his temper, pointed at his 
own lawyer and at me and said – in a loud, flustered and almost panicked 
voice – that he was tired of “the two of us telling him what to say” in his 
evidence during the deposition.  Never has there been clearer evidence on 
a deposition record of a lawyer being caught having coached his client 
during a break to change or tailor his evidence.  Because the Dealership 
case was being dealt with pursuant to a private arbitration regime, the 
typical procedural safeguards provided for by a court were not 
immediately present to curb or punish the behaviour of the Corporation or 
its lawyers in these contexts of document hiding and witness coaching.   
Now my reader might ask at this stage that, although unfortunate 
for John, what do these procedural injustices in a one-off corporate dispute 
have to do with wider public interest values?  First of all, as it turned out, 
the Dealership case was not an isolated dispute, but rather the result of a 
pattern of potentially fraudulent conduct on the part of the Corporation.  
Throughout our retainer with John, we received a relatively steady stream 
of anecdotal information about similarly situated dealers in the United 
States finding themselves in the same position vis-à-vis the Corporation 
and its deceptive and aggressive business practices.  We also learned, 
again anecdotally, about a number of similar arbitrations being pursued by 
or against the Corporation.  Because of the strict confidentiality provisions 
surrounding those proceedings, however, we were not able to obtain 
evidence about those other arbitrations, either through informal inquiries 
or through repeated efforts through the production and deposition stages of 
the proceeding.  Denials of other proceedings were all that were 
forthcoming from the Corporation’s officers and its lawyers.   
However, approximately two weeks before our arbitration hearing 
was set to begin, I received in the mail a list of approximately 30 or 40 
similar, active arbitral proceedings in which the Corporation was involved.  
The list – that was included in a report to the Corporation’s auditors that 
its lawyers had mistakenly sent to me – established clearly that the 
conduct engaged in by the Corporation with John was a pattern of repeated 
conduct that had led to similar disputes with numerous other dealers across 
the United States.  In the face of this list, it seemed difficult for the 
Corporation to continue to voice – in good faith – its denial of the 
existence of these proceedings or their relevance.  Unfortunately, because 
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of professional and evidentiary reasons that prohibited us from leading the 
evidence in the arbitration, that is exactly what the Corporation did: it 
proceeded at the arbitration as though those other proceedings did not 
exist.  And the arbitrator’s judgment did not take into account the fact that 
the conduct about which John was complaining was a course of conduct in 
which the Corporation was engaging with dozens of other dealers across 
the United States. 
Second, beyond the specifics of John’s dispute with the 
Corporation and all of the other cases involving the Corporation, the 
potential ripple effect that cases such as the Dealership case could have on 
corporate culture, decision–making and resource allocation – for example 
within numerous similarly-situated North American franchise sectors – is 
significant.  It is this behaviour modification discussion – and its overall 
place in the regulation of society – to which I turn next. 
C. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON DEMOCRACY 
A typical – but very narrow and misguided – understanding of the 
purpose of a civil justice system is that it exists primarily to resolve 
disputes.  For example, according to a very recent treatment of civil justice 
reform by Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman, the “main goal of the court 
system is to differentiate between those who obeyed the law and those 
who did not, and to administer the disputes that are brought before it 
according to substantive law.”148  Even more traditional accounts often 
suffer from a similar narrowness.  According to Berlins and Dyer, the 
“courtroom” has for “centuries…been the setting for the final settlement 
of disputes…”149  Of course Klement and Neeman, as well as Berlins and 
Dyer, are partly correct: dispute resolution is one of the purposes of a civil 
                                                 
148 Alon Klement and Zvika Neeman, “Civil Justice Reform: A Mechanism Design 
Framework” (2008) 164 J. of Institutional and Theoretical Econ. at 1, online: SSRN 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=998028>. 
 
149 Marcel Berlins and Clare Dyer, The Law Machine, 3d ed. (London: Penguin, 1989) at 
18.  Similarly, when describing the British system of government, Anthony Birch makes 
only passing reference to the role of courts in the overall process of governing.  See 
Anthony H. Birch, The British System of Government, 7th ed. (London: Allen & Unwin, 
1986) at 221-224. 
 




justice system.  However, it certainly is not its only purpose and is not 
always its most important purpose.   
There are many aspects to the way we order ourselves and our 
affairs in society.  At the personal level, custom, religion, morality, 
tradition, etc., all often play determining roles.  However, as W. H. 
Jennings has pointed out,  
As soon as man began to live in groups, rules became 
necessary to govern his relations with his fellows.  Even in 
the most primitive forms of society both the rights of the 
individual and the common interests of the community 
were bound to emerge and create a need for governing 
social relationships.150 
Today, these social relationships – at the level of civil society – are 
governed by two primary regulatory tools: legislation and adjudication.  
And of these two tools, adjudication plays a central function in our 
regulatory state.  As Héctor Fix-Fierro comments, courts “participate 
openly in the constitutional and political process...” and have become a 
“…real branch of government, at least in the sense that they now play an 
important role in shaping the general direction of society.”151 
The basic premise therefore behind a robust public dispute 
resolution system, in addition to resolving disputes, is to create a fair, 
predicable, accessible, just and relatively common regulatory system for 
all.  For example, when referring to the development of the modern courts 
in England after the passing of the Judicature Acts of 1873-1875 and into 
the 20th century, R. M. Jackson has argued that the “growth and expansion 
of the King’s Courts was doubtless an excellent thing for the building of a 
                                                 
150 W. H. Jennings, Canadian Law: For Business & Personal Use (Toronto: The Ryerson 
Press, 1951) 1-2. 
 
151 Courts, Justice and Efficiency, supra note 127 at 14-15.  For further discussions, see 
Ian Greene, “The Courts and Democracy” in Ian Greene, The Courts (Vancouver: UBC 
Press, 2006) at c. 6, Peter Russell, “Judicial Power in Canada’s Political Culture” in F. L. 
Morton, ed., Law, Politics and the Judicial Process in Canada (Calgary: The University 
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uniform law and standard of justice in the country…”152  And a system of 
justice includes not only tools for retrospective dispute resolution, but also 
robust tools for prospective behaviour modification and societal regulation 
through processes of adjudication. 
There are at least three key components of the adjudicative side of 
this equation.  First, public civil justice systems are clearly central actors 
in the adjudicative process.  As S. M. Waddams has summarized, in 
addition to “statutes”, the “study of law is, to a large extent, the study 
of…judicial decisions.”153  Second, as argued above,154 in our highly 
complex and regulated democracies, the administrative system plays an 
equally, if not more important role.  Again as Waddams has discussed, in a 
“highly regulated state…there are thousands of administrative bodies 
exercising very important regulatory and adjudicative powers…[A]s a 
practical matter, the direct effect of regulatory tribunals is often of more 
importance than the direct effect of legislation or of judicial decisions.”155  
Third, again as argued above,156 in addition to the state funded and created 
civil courts and administrative processes, there is a vast body of 
“alternative” justice – largely in the form or arbitration, mediation, etc. – 
that, as the Supreme Court of Canada recognized in Desputeaux, forms a 
“fully recognized” part of a state’s overall adjudicative process.157 
                                                 
152 J. R. Spencer, ed., Jackson’s Machinery of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1989) at 8.  At the same time, however, Jackson does acknowledge that uniformity 
of courts in England did come potentially at the price of “competing courts which were 
perhaps more suitable for poor litigants and small cases.”  Ibid. 
 
153 S. M. Waddams, Introduction to the Study of Law, 3d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1987) at 
19 [Introduction to the Study of Law]. 
 
154 Supra part VI. 
 
155 Introduction to the Study of Law, supra note 153 at 19. 
 
156 Supra part VII. 
 
157 Desputeaux v. Éditions Chouette (1987) inc., supra note 122 at para. 41, LeBel 
J. 
 




Tribunals and courts, therefore, not only keep legislation in check 
through hearings, trials and processes of judicial review,158 they also – 
through both the full light and the shadow of the common law – create a 
body of law that directly governs and indirectly guides much of what we 
do in our daily lives.159  This includes both individuals and corporations.  
As such, far from simple mechanical dispute ending tools, civil dispute 
resolution regimes play a central role in the regulatory processes of 
modern Western democracies.160 
Given this central role in processes of democratic governance, the 
move to privatize public civil dispute resolution regimes has profound 
implications for how we govern ourselves in a free and democratic 
society.  Put simply, to the extent that we are privatizing public civil 
dispute resolution systems, we are essentially privatizing a significant part 
of the way democracy is realized.  
Here again we return to the Dealership case.  By seeing that case as 
simply an A v. B case of only limited private (commercial) interest, there 
is no need to concern ourselves with the procedural violations that 
occurred in that case or even the potentially fraudulent conduct that 
negatively impacted John and 30 or 40 similarly situated United States 
                                                 
158 For some foundational works and statements on judicial review, see e.g. Alexander M. 
Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics, 2d ed. 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1986), Robert K. Carr, The Supreme 
Court and Judicial Review (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1942), Arthur A. 
North, The Supreme Court: Judicial Process and Judicial Politics (New York: Merredith, 
1966), the Rt. Hon. Lord Denning, M.R., The Discipline of Law (London: Butterworths, 
1979) at 133.  See more recently Gerald Baier, Courts and Federalism: Judicial Doctrine 
in the United States, Australia, and Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2006). 
 
159 See e.g. Owen Fiss, “The Forms of Justice” (1979) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, reprinted in 
Owen Fiss, The Law as It Could Be (New York: New York University Press, 2003) 1, 
“Against Settlement”, supra note 139, David Luban, “Settlements and the Erosion of the 
Public Realm” (1995) 83 Geo. L.J. 2619.  For a collection and discussion of these and 
other materials on this issue, see Julie Macfarlane, gen. ed. et al., Dispute Resolution: 
Readings and Case Studies, 2d ed. (Toronto: Emond Montgomery, 2003) 615-620. 
 
160 For a discussion of the court’s regulatory role and its relationship to the state’s 
legislative function, see W. Kip Viscusi, ed., Regulation through Litigation (Washington, 
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dealers.  According to Hadfield, for example, we are not concerned with 
the “fair[ness]” of that commercial case.161  However, if we see that case, 
instead, as a potential opportunity not only to shut down the problematic 
conduct of a significant United States goods and service provider but also 
to send a significant signal to other similarly-situated individual and 
corporate actors (and lawyers) in society about the negative repercussions 
of engaging in that sort of conduct, opinions, policies, resource allocation, 
overall corporate behaviour and potentially legislation (regulating both 
corporations and lawyers) would likely change.  That is the power of the 
adjudicative aspect to our processes of democratic governance.  
Privatizing those tool risks losing that power.   
X. FUTURE THINKING: JUSTICE MUST TRUMP 
EFFICIENCY 
The shift that I see being required – to avoid further jeopardizing 
the regulatory power of adjudication – is a shift in the overall mindset of 
those who work in and think about public civil dispute resolution 
processes and their reform.  Put simply, all civil justice policy, reform 
thinking and implementation needs to start from a bottom-line premise 
based not on notions of efficiency – where, as Héctor Fix-Fierro has 
recognized,162 it currently lies – but rather on robust notions of justice.  
The two premises are not necessarily or always mutually exclusive.  Often 
when disputes are resolved more efficiently, justice obtains.163  However, 
on occasions when they are mutually exclusive, and in any event, justice 
must be the ultimate arbiter when it comes to making significant policy 
choices and resource allocation decisions at all levels and regarding all 
players – individual and corporate – within our systems of civil justice.  
To do otherwise risks one of the very foundational aspects of our 
processes of democratic governance.  As the Chief Justice of Canada 
recently acknowledged,  
                                                 
161 “Privatizing Commercial Law”, supra note 129 at 40. 
 
162 See supra note 127 and surrounding text.  See also “More Access to Less Justice”, 
supra note 128. 
 
163 See e.g. supra parts III, VIII. 
 




Courts have been promoting various forms of out-of-court 
mediation and arbitration as a more effective way of 
achieving settlement and dealing with many civil cases.  
This is good.  But the fact is, some cases should go to court.  
They raise legal issues that should be considered by the 
courts for the good of the litigants and the development of 
the law.164 
 In my view this shift in mindset and this cautionary sensibility 
about ADR should obtain at all three levels of the civil dispute resolution 
system – courts, tribunals and arbitration panels – that I discuss in this 
article. 
A. COURTS 
 In the operation of civil courts, for example, all players – 
specifically including masters and judges – should not be overly pressured 
into realizing economic efficiencies – backlog and cost reduction, etc. – to 
the down-playing of fundamental principles of justice that celebrate the 
public resolution of policy-making disputes, which do not only include 
landmark Charter and other public law cases but also, sometimes, include 
the day-to-day cases of A v. B. (involving both private individuals and 
corporations, like the Dealership case). 
I am aware that masters and judges already have the power to – 
and sometimes do – make these sorts of decisions to privilege a sensibility 
of justice over that of efficiency in the context of choices regarding ADR 
and privatization.  For example, when deciding on whether to exempt a 
case from mandatory mediation, the court has the power to move a case 
off a mediation list for several reasons, including where matters of 
significant public interest are involved.  In O. (G.) v. H. (C.D.), Kiteley J. 
articulated the following considerations in these sorts of circumstances: 
                                                 
164 Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “The Challenges We Face” at “The Challenge of 
Delays in the Justice System” (remarks presented at Empire Club of Canada, Toronto, 8 
March 2007), online: Supreme Court of Canada <http://www.scc-
csc.gc.ca/aboutcourt/judges/speeches/Challenges_e.asp>.  For a report of these remarks, 
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At the risk of generalizing from the few reasons for 
decision and from the somewhat cryptic explanation made 
by the local mediation co-ordinators in the list tracking 
exemptions, it would appear that the following criteria are 
relevant to whether an exemption order should be granted: 
- whether the parties have already engaged in a 
form of dispute resolution, and, in the interests 
of reducing cost and delay, they ought not to be 
required to repeat the effort; [and] 
- whether the issue involves a matter of public 
interest or importance which requires 
adjudication in order to establish an authority 
which will be persuasive if not binding on other 
cases…165  
It was the second of these types of considerations – considerations 
involving matters of public interest – that animated Master Beaudoin’s 
reasons in Wilson v. Canada (Attorney General).166  In that case, the 
applicants challenged s. 25(4) of the Public Services Superannuation Act, 
R.S.C 1985 c. P-36 – regarding the definition of a “surviving spouse”, 
which included the words “opposite sex” – as violating s. 15 of the 
Charter.  The moving parties in the particular motion before the Master 
sought leave to have the proceedings exempted from a mandatory referral 
to mediation, as – in their view – it would “not be productive given the 
subject matter of the Application.”167  Master Beaudoin, when granting the 
motion, gave the following reasons: 
The Ottawa Practice Direction with respect to mandatory 
referral to mediation contemplates a referral to interest-
based mediation.  Through the intervention of a third party 
neutral, the parties are encouraged to consider a resolution 
of their dispute on terms that consider their broader 
                                                 
165 O. (G.) v. H. (C.D.), supra note 48 at para. 13 (S.C.J.). 
 
166 [1998] O.J. No. 1780 (Master) (QL).  Wilson was cited in the O. (G.) v. H. (C.D.) case. 
 
167 Ibid. at para. 2. 
 




interests rather than a strict consideration of their rights; 
often requiring the parties to arrive at a form of 
compromise.  In this instance, the resolution of this 
application requires the determination of the rights of the 
individual applicants, not only for themselves but for all 
others who are similarly situated. 
There is no precedent to guide the court in this matter.  An 
article entitled The Adequacy of the Adversarial System in 
Charter Litigation by Robin S. Sharma in the National 
Journal of Constitutional Law [3 N.J.C.L.], in my view, 
correctly sets out the approach to be taken.  At p. 119 the 
author cites two reasons why Alternative Dispute 
Resolution techniques may not be appropriate in resolving 
Charter disputes.  With regard to the second reason the 
author states: 
...constitutional cases, so often involving 
issues of paramount societal concern, must 
have the ability to influence and shape future 
conduct and to prompt necessary 
behavioural changes.  This requires 
adjudication within a public forum such as a 
law court where the public interest is 
represented and binding, effective decisions 
are rendered. 
While the author goes on to suggest that certain cases exist 
where compromise/settlement procedures should be 
considered seriously, this is not one of those cases.  The 
ultimate disposition of this application will have 
implications for same sex couples throughout the country 
and accordingly, leave to be exempted from the referral is 
granted.168 
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 Mediation and other ADR processes should continue not to be 
encouraged in these sorts of high profile public interest cases.  However, 
what counts as “public interest” should not be viewed narrowly as only to 
include these sorts of Charter challenges.  While these cases are clearly 
important, they are not the only cases that act to shape the conduct and 
relationships of day-to-day people on day-to-day issues.  All cases should 
be seen as potential candidates to be moved off the privatization track and 
onto – or back into – a public track.  Current and overwhelming 
preferences for efficiency, particularly in the moments of a civil case when 
decisions about case management or court-annexed ADR processes are 
made, militate against this tendency.  And not only should this shift in 
underlying preferences occur at the operational stage of the court’s work, 
but also at the policy and reform levels as well. 
B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES 
 The same shift in sensibility needs also to obtain at the 
administrative level.  Clearly – to-date – government preferences for 
including and encouraging ADR at all levels of operation has resulted in 
the significant use of ADR throughout the federal and provincial 
administrative system.169  According to the settlement rates and statistics 
of some of these tribunals, the use of ADR is becoming the norm.170 
 Like with the court system, the problem is not that tools do not 
exist for these sorts of justice-based considerations.  They do.  For 
example, notwithstanding the CHRC’s preference and active promotion of 
ADR when resolving complaints,171 it still retains the jurisdiction to 
review complaints on a case-by-case basis to determine whether public 
policy considerations militate against the use of ADR: 
The Commission’s focused litigation strategy allows it to 
support the parties at pre-tribunal mediation, while it 
concentrates on vigorously pursuing high-impact, public 
                                                 
169 See supra part VI. 
 
170 See e.g. supra note 96 and surrounding text. 
 
171 Supra note 73 and surrounding text. 
 




interest cases before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.  
On a case-by-case basis, the Commission determines the 
scope and nature of its participation before the Tribunal 
after assessing such factors as whether the case raises broad 
policy issues, relates to major policy concerns, or raises 
new points of law.  The Commission can also intervene in 
precedent-setting cases before courts and administrative 
tribunals dealing with human rights issues.172 
 Of course “high-impact” cases that involve the “public interest” 
and “major policy concerns” should – typically – be subjet to the scrutiny 
and rigour of the public tribunal process.  However, as argued above in the 
context of the Dealership case (although admitedly not an administrative 
case), there are many instances in which cases that are not high impact or 
high profile turn out to be significant in terms of overall societal 
regulation.  Those cases, too, should become candidates for staying on the 
public track.  At the moment, my fear is that the sensibility of privatization 
systematically leads these sorts of cases to the private track.  
Another good potential example for thinking on this point includes 
initaitves of the Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) in the area 
of monitoring and regulating settlements.  The OHRC, as guided by s. 
33(1) of the Human Rights Code,173 is encouraged to pursue settlements of 
complaints, including through its mediation processes.174  However, 
notwithstaning this strong policy preference, it retains the ability at least 
partially to control the process and content of settlements.  For example, 
settlements reached pursuant to mediation processes that engage matters of 
                                                 
172 CHRC, 2006 Annual Report at 8 (Resources, Publications, Reports: “Public Interest 
Litigation”), supra note 74. 
 
173 R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended.  The new Human Rights Amendment Act, 2006 will 
come into effect on 30 June 2008.  See S.O. 2006, c. 30.  Significantly, among other 
major changes, complaints will now typically be dealt with by the Human Rights 
Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO). 
 
174 See OHRC, “Internal Guide to Processing Complaints, “Mediation”, online: OHRC 
<http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/commission/complaint_processing_guides/internal/pdf> at 44.  
Mediation will also be used by the HRTO.  See HRTO, “Mediation and Adjudication”, 
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public interest must be approved by the OHRC to ensure the interests of 
the public are protected.175  Further, settlements that engage matters of 
public interest may be publicized by the OHRC, even if the parties to the 
mediation process do not consent.176  Finally, the OHRC specifically 
discourages the use of confidentiality clauses in minutes of settlement.177 
All of these are good considerations in the context of making 
decisions about the use of mediation or other privatizing tools at the 
tribunal level.  However, my fear is that when these decisions actually get 
made – i.e. whether to proceed to mediation or whether to push for the 
publication of a settlement, etc. – the principle of efficiency trumps that of 
public interest and justice.  Although the public interest is an issue that is 
obviously important to the OHRC, my concern here is hightened after 
looking, for example, at the OHRC’s list of occasions in which it 
considers mediation not to be appropriate, which may include: 
• The existence of a section 34 request that staff have 
assessed as likely to result in a “not deal with” 
recommendation and decision;  
• The complaint or the respondent[s] rejects mediation 
and wishes to proceed directly to the formal process of 
investigation; 
• Neither side is willing to consider a settlement;  
• One side is seeking punitive action.178 
There is nothing in this list that specifically references the “public 
interest”, which – in my view – should be of central concern to these sorts 
of privatization considerations.  Further, when it comes to publicizing 
settlements, the OHRC’s stated position is that it “initiates publicity in a 
                                                 
175 See OHRC, “Internal Guide to Processing Complaints, “Mediation”, supra note 174 at 
45. 
 
176 Ibid. at 46. 
 
177 Ibid. at “Settlement”, 54. 
 
178 Ibid. at “Mediation”, 47. 
 




very small proportion of its cases.”179  Although not every case is a matter 
of wide-spread notariety or media attention, like with many cases pursued 
in court (or in arbitral proceedings, including cases like the Dealership 
case), there is real value vis-à-vis societal regulation in maintaining the 
public profile of the resolution of those disputes.  Again, our over-riding 
sensibility should be guided by principles of open justice, not private 
efficiency. 
C. NON-COURT OR ADMINISTRATIVE-BASED LEGISLATIVE ADR 
PROCESSES 
 The third level of the civil dispute resolution system that needs to 
ensure that justice is retained as a – and ideally the – animating sensibility 
is the legislatively-sanctioned ADR regime (e.g. arbitration sanctioned by 
federal or provincial arbitration legislation).180  Because of arbitration’s 
very existence as a private alternative to the public system, it is on first 
blush difficult to envisage overly aggressive policy changes that will lead 
to dramatic increases in the level of publicity of this typically private 
system.  These changes will be particularly difficult to effect if arguments 
such as those advanced by Gillian Hadfield181 or the Honourable Gord 
Mackintosh182 primarily drive our thinking. 
 However, it was these sorts of arguments of privileging justice 
over efficiency that guided the Ontario Government’s reform of its 
Arbitration Act, 1991 to exclude the legislation’s application to family law 
arbitrations that, in effect, do not comply with what Ontario deems to be in 
the interests of justice (regardless of an outcome’s efficiency).183  While 
the interests at stake in these reforms were particularly important 
(involving rights relating to equality, religion and the family), there are 
many other circumstances in which the results of an arbitral process 
                                                 
179 Ibid. at “Settlement”, 53. 
 
180 Discussed supra part VII. 
 
181 Supra note 129 and surrounding text. 
 
182 See supra notes 119, 130 and surrounding text. 
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should not be deferred to by a public court or sanctioned by the force of 
the state’s enforcement tools and should, potentially, become part of the 
public record.  The Dealership case, in my view, is an example of one of 
those cases.  Our current preferences for the sanctity of contract and the 
sanctity of the private arbitration process militate against reforms that 
would preference notions of justice over notions of free market efficiency.  
In my view, these current preferences risk jeopardizing the foundations of 
our regulatory state. 
XI. CONCLUSION 
Fundamentally changing a central aspect of a democracy’s 
regulatory structure, one would think, should require significant debate 
and far-reaching public consultation.  To-date, no such wide-ranging and 
robust debate or consultation – on a fully informed basis – has 
characterized the modern and wide-ranging tendency to privatize our 
public systems of civil dispute resolution.  On my reading of the policy 
thinking and legislative history of this overall trend of privatization, while 
there has been some significant discussion within the justice system 
particularly concerning the merits of ADR, there is little or no awareness 
at the level of the general public about the significance of these issues or 
their potential concerns as they relate to the overall workings of society.   
As was recognized during legislative standing committee 
statements surrounding Ontario’s approach to ADR in 1990, “Because of 
arbitration being a private matter, most members of the public are unaware 
of the many matters that are resolved by this technique and this 
mechanism.”184  This statement is still by and large true today.  And while 
there is at least some debate about how the common law is created and 
administered in the public sphere, often through discussions framed in 
support or critique of “judicial activism”,185 the public is generally 
ignorant of a much more prevalent – at least in terms of our public civil 
justice system (to the extent that 95-98% of cases in that system, for 
                                                 
184 Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Official Reported of Debates (Hansard), (14 February 
1990) at J-102 (Gordon F. Henderson). 
 
185 See e.g. the discussions cited in “Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate”, supra 
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example, settle by some alternative process186) – trend away from an 
accountable form of adjudicative governance.  As I have said elsewhere: 
“it never ceases to amaze me that the public, while typically up in arms 
about the ‘activism’ of our public judges, is largely silent (or ignorant) 
about the significant decisions made everyday by private decision-makers 
behind closed-doors.”187 
Fundamentally privatizing our public civil dispute resolution 
systems merits significantly more public debate – and understanding – 
than what has to-date occurred.  Whether and how we continue actively to 
privatize our tools of civil justice are questions that will have a dramatic 
impact not only on how people resolve individual disputes, but also on 
how we as a collective govern ourselves in our democracy.  There are 
clearly well documented reasons for pursuing privatization, at least in 
some cases.  However, the current trend of privatization – largely in the 
name of cost and efficiency – is being conducted without adequate public 
debate about, let alone public understanding of, all of the implications – 
positive and negative – of this clear policy choice.188  We must recognize 
the potential strengths of dispute resolution alternatives.  However, only 
through responsible, public participation in the development of these 
processes will we avoid an erosion of our core democratic values 
significantly embodied in a strong rule of law system, simply in the name 
of speed and efficiency.  We cannot treat justice simply as an externality.  
Again quoting from the Chief Justice of Canada: 
In this country, we realize that without justice, we have no 
rights, no peace, no prosperity.  We realize that, once lost, 
justice is difficult to reinstate.  We in Canada are the 
inheritors of a good justice system, one that is the envy of 
the world.  Let us face our challenges squarely and thus 
                                                 
186 Discussed supra note 60 and surrounding text. 
 
187 “Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate”, supra note 8 at 82 (footnote omitted). 
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ensure that our justice system remains strong and 
effective.189 
 Ensuring that our justice system remains “strong and effective” 
does not mean selling it out to the lowest bidder.  Whether we are talking 
about courts, tribunals or legislatively-sanctioned private arbitration panels 
that enjoy the coercive enforcement powers of the state, justice – not 
efficiency – must be our fundamental guide in determining how these 
bodies operate and how they will be reformed going forward. 
 
                                                 
189 Rt. Hon. Beverley McLachlin, P.C., “The Challenges We Face”, supra note 164 at 
“Conclusion”. 
